Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED

98 15 JUN 25 1998

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No.

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

ROBYN ASTAIRE,
Petitioner,

VS.

BEST FILM & VIDEO CORPORATION,
Respondent.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether an important state-law question of first impression should be certified to the highest state court, when the court of appeals based its decision exclusively on its interpretation of a state statute as to which no state appellate court has issued an opinion, the panel majority acknowledged a "fairly convoluted statutory scheme," a dissenting member of the panel offered a different interpretation of the statute, and a state provision enacted after the decision creates a process by which state-law questions may be certified to the highest state court.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The parties to the proceeding below and before this Court are:

1. Robyn Astaire; and
2. Best Film & Video Corporation.[1]

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[1] Best Film & Video Corporation has no parent company, nor does it have any subsidiary that is not wholly owned.

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Robyn Astaire respectfully petitions for a *writ of certiorari* to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (and, more specifically, denial of her petition for rehearing and certification of a state law issue to the California Supreme Court) in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (App., *infra*, A-1) is reported as *Robyn Astaire v. Best Film & Video Corp.*, 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997); the opinion was subsequently amended and reported at 136 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1998) (App., *infra*, B-1).

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of the district court was invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship). The court of appeals entered its judgment on June 20, 1997; the judgment and order were amended on February 19, 1998. The notice of reassignment of the case was filed on April 30, 1998. The notice of extension to file Writ of Certiorari was entered on May 13, 1998. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

A. Section 990 of the California Civil Code.

B. California Rule of Court 29.5.

Relevant portions of these statutory provisions are reproduced at App., *infra,* D-1 to D-5; E-1 to E-4.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Summary

This case arises out of a civil lawsuit alleging unauthorized use of legendary performer Fred Astaire's likeness, in violation of California Civil Code section 990 ("section 990"). Petitioner Robyn Astaire ("Mrs. Astaire") is the widow of Fred Astaire, and succeeded to all rights in his name, voice, signature, photograph and likeness under section 990; in 1989, she sued respondent Best Film & Video ("Best") in federal district court alleging *inter alia* that dance instructional videotapes manufactured and produced by Best violated her rights under section 990 through the unauthorized use of Fred Astaire's image as it appears in film clips taken from two of his movies (*Second Chorus* and *Royal Wedding*). App., *infra,* B-8.

On summary judgment, the district court concluded that Best's unauthorized use of Fred Astaire's likeness violated the prohibition in section 990 against the unauthorized use of a celebrity's persona "on or in products, merchandise, or goods." Over a dissent by Circuit Judge Shroeder, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment in an opinion filed June 20, 1997: even assuming that Best had used Fred Astaire's likeness for advertising purposes within the meaning of section 990, subdivision (a), the panel majority held in an opinion authored by Senior Circuit Judge Wiggins that such unauthorized advertising use nonetheless fell within a statutory *exemption* set forth in subdivision (n) of section 990. App., *infra,* D-5.

After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, petitioner filed a petition for rehearing *en banc;* the petition was denied, and the written opinion originally filed was amended on February 19, 1998. App., *infra,* B-1. In the interim, the California Supreme Court enacted California Rule of Court 29.5, expressly permitting a federal court to certify state law issues to the California Supreme Court. Mrs. Astaire filed a motion to stay issuance of the mandate and to certify the state law question (namely, interpretation of section 990) to the California Supreme Court under Rule 29.5; petitioner also filed a petition for rehearing on the same grounds. On April 13, 1998, the panel denied the motion to stay issuance of the mandate and to certify question to the California Supreme Court and also denied the motion to file the petition for rehearing. App., *infra,* C-1.

B. California Civil Code Section 990

As noted above, Mrs. Astaire brought suit under section 990, a California statute which creates a cause of action for the unauthorized use of a deceased personality's persona. The statute provides that "[a]ny person who uses a de-

ceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services, without prior consent . . . shall be liable . . . " App., *infra,* D-1.

Subsections (n)(1) through (4) of section 990 provide, however, that this section shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any of the following instances: (1) a play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement not exempt under paragraph (4); (2) material that is of political or newsworthy value; (3) single and original works of fine art; and (4) an advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted by paragraph (1), (2), or (3). App., *infra,* D-5.

C. Proceedings Below

1. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Majority Opinion and Dissent

As the court of appeals panel expressly stated, the district court made the following legal determinations in entering a judgment for Mrs. Astaire: (1) Best's use of the Astaire film clips was covered by section 990(a)'s "on or in products, merchandise, or goods" language; (2) Best's use of the Astaire film clips was not a use for "advertising, selling, or soliciting" in violation of section 990(a); (3) Best's use of the Astaire film clips was not exempt under section 990(n); (4) Mrs. Astaire's section 990 claim was not preempted by the federal Copyright Act; and (5) Best's use of Astaire's likeness was not protected by the First Amendment. App., *infra,* B-10.

Since the case involved a California statute, the panel initially acknowledged that, "[f]or questions of California

law, we must apply the law as we believe the California Supreme Court would apply." App., *infra,* . In light of the fact no California court has interpreted the provisions of section 990, the panel further observed that (in the absence of a California Supreme Court decision) it was required to "predict how the California Supreme Court would decide the issue, using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises and restatements as guidance." App., *infra,* B-10. Moreover, the panel observed, " . . . if Best's use is exempt from § 990 liability altogether, we need not reach the other issues presented by this case." App., *infra,* B-11.

Following a brief recitation of California law on statutory interpretation, the majority proceeded to "predict how the California Supreme Court would decide the issue." App., *infra,* B-10. The majority concluded that subsection (n)(1) of section 990 limits the exemption for use in a play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program, so that such uses are not exempt if they are advertisements or commercial announcements. App., *infra,* D-5. According to the panel majority, however, that limitation is *itself limited*: such advertisements or commercial announcements *may still be exempt* under subsection (n)(4) of section 990 — described in the opinion as "the provision which exempts advertisements and commercial announcements for the uses described in subsections (n)(1), (n)(2), and (n)(3). App., *infra,* D-5.

The panel majority thus concluded that the determination of whether a use is exempt under subsection (n)(1) requires reference to subsection (n)(4), which in turn "refers back" to subsections (n)(1), (n)(2), and (n)(3). Given this somewhat tortured construction of the statute, the panel characterized the provisions set forth in section 990 as a *"fairly convoluted statutory scheme."* App., *infra,* B-13. The panel majority concluded that "Best's videotapes are among

the uses exempted by the first part of subsection (n)(1)" — and that "subsection (n)(4) provides that even if Best's use of the Astaire film clips is an advertisement or commercial announcement, such a use is exempt from liability." App., *infra,* B-15. On that basis, the majority reversed the district court ruling and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Best. App., *infra,* B-21.

In her dissenting opinion, however, Circuit Judge Schroeder expressly stated that "the statute is not as clear as judges would like." App., *infra,* B-21. In her view, "the majority goes wrong when it holds that this use of the Astaire footage is exempt as an 'advertisement or commercial announcement' of an exempt use." App., *infra,* B-21. She termed "incorrect" the majority's reasoning that the language of subsection (n)(4) exempts all announcements for plays, films, videotapes, and so on — since that subsection exempts *only* advertisements or commercial announcements for uses permitted in the earlier paragraphs. App., *infra,* B-22. The majority's interpretation of section 990(n), she commented, would permit one to "with impunity hawk a videotape on fashion for the next century by introducing it with footage of Jacqueline Kennedy"; concluding that section 990 was intended to prevent (and not immunize) such exploitation, Judge Schroeder dissented from the majority's conclusion. App., *infra,* B-22.

2. The Amended Opinion

In denying Mrs. Astaire's subsequent petition for rehearing *en banc,* the panel dismissed the suggestion that its interpretation of § 990(n) raised the "spectre of a 'draconian' destruction of 'legitimate publicity rights' . . ." App., *infra,* B-16. In fact, the panel stated that Mrs. Astaire was "asking courts to make a content-based decision every time a filmmaker or author uses the name or image of celebrity"; this would "create uncertainty in the law," and "there is no

suggestion within § 990 or its legislative history that the California state legislature intended such an inquiry." App., *infra,* B-17. Accordingly, the panel suggested Mrs. Astaire's proposed interpretation of section 990(n) would result in absurdity — and it thus could not consider her interpretation (which it described as ignoring the language in section 990(n)(1)), to be more reasonable than that adopted by the panel majority. App., *infra,* B-15 to B-16.

3. Newly Enacted California Rule of Court 29.5

Effective January 1, 1998, newly adopted California Rule of Court 29.5 (expressly governing "Questions of state law certified by federal appellate courts and other courts") establishes a procedure by which a state law question may be certified to the California Supreme Court in the event the decisions of the California appellate courts provide no controlling precedent concerning the certified question. Subdivision (a) of Rule 29.5 provides that "[t]he California Supreme Court may answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a United States Court of Appeals, or the court of last resort of any state, territory, or commonwealth . . . App., *infra,* E-1.

Relying on newly enacted Rule 29.5 in her second petition for rehearing and motion for stay of mandate, Mrs. Astaire requested that the court of appeals exercise its newly conferred authority to certify this state law question to the California Supreme Court — and resolve any ambiguity in section 990(n) (thereby providing an indisputably correct answer to the key question of statutory interpretation at issue in this case). Since Rule 29.5 was enacted after the case had initially been briefed and argued, no device previously existed by which the state law question could have been certified to the California Supreme Court. As noted above, the panel declined to exercise its discretion to so

certify the state law question to the California Supreme Court, App., *infra,* C-1.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The refusal by the court of appeals to certify the state-law question in this case so departs from customary Ninth Circuit procedure as to warrant exercise of this Court's supervisory power. Given precedent in both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and this Court, it was an abuse of discretion to deny Mrs. Astaire's motion for stay of mandate and certification to the California Supreme Court pursuant to California Rule of Court 29.5, *in light of the fact that* the case was decided exclusively by the panel majority's interpretation of section 990, the text of section 990 clearly admits of varying interpretations, the dissenting member of the panel rejected the majority's interpretation of the statute, and no California appellate court has rendered an opinion on its provisions.

I.

In Light Of The Fact That This Case Presents An Important State Law Issue Of First Impression, The Ninth Circuit Abused Its Discretion in Denying The Request For Certification Of The State-Law Question

The device of certifying a question of state law as to which there is substantial doubt to the highest court of a state is not novel. In *Clay V. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,* 363 U.S. 207, 80 S.Ct. 1222 (1960), for instance, the preliminary question of state law before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals involved a Florida statute; finding the state law uncertain, the Circuit Court of Appeals decided instead to decide the constitutional question that would be presented only if Florida law did not apply. *Clay,* 363 U.S. at 209, 80 S.Ct. at 1224. This Court vacated the judgment of

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, on the ground that the constitutional issue should only have been reached if, after decision of two non-constitutional questions, decision was compelled. *Clay,* 363 U.S. at 209, 80 S.Ct. at 1224.

Observing that both questions not disposed of by the Court of Appeals were questions of local law, the Court also noted that the questions were ones on which the state court's determination was controlling. *Clay,* 363 U.S. at 212, 80 S.Ct. at 1225-1226. Since the Court of Appeals indicated it could not make a confident guess as to how the Florida Supreme Court would construe the statute, this Court pointed out that the "Florida Legislature, with rare foresight, has dealt with the problem of authoritatively determining unresolved state law involved in federal litigation by a statute which permits a federal court to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court of Florida for its decision." *Clay,* 363 U.S. at 212, 80 S.Ct. at 1226.

Thus, in vacating the judgment below in order to permit possible disposition on non-constitutional grounds, this Court strongly suggested that certification (then a novel procedure) be used to accomplish this. The certification procedure has, in fact, been used on a number of occasions since *Clay.* In 1974, for example, this Court gave strong endorsement to certification of state questions under the same Florida statute, holding that certification could be used even in a diversity case that raised no constitutional issue. *Lehman Bros. v. Schein,* 416 U.S. 386, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974).

In *Lehman Bros.,* shareholder diversity suits were brought in federal court in New York against a Florida corporation; both the district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Florida law was controlling. *Lehman Bros.,* 416 U.S. at 387-388, 94 S.Ct. at 1742. Although the Court of Appeals held that Florida law was controlling, "it

found none that was decisive." *Lehman Bros.*, 416 U.S. at 389, 94 S.Ct. at 1743. Accordingly, the court of appeals turned to the law of other jurisdictions (particularly that of New York) to predict what Florida would "probably" do. *Ibid.*. In so doing, the panel majority then determined that Florida "would probably" interpret *Diamond v. Oreamuno*, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910 (1969), to make it applicable — "viewing the case as the Florida court would probably view it." *Lehman Bros.*, 416 U.S. at 389, 94 S.Ct. at 1743.

The dissenter on the Court of Appeals urged, however, that the state-law question be certified to the Florida Supreme Court (under the same statute invoked in *Clay*). *Lehman Bros.*, 416 U.S. at 389-390, 94 S.Ct. at 1743. This Court agreed and vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit, remanding the case to enable the court of appeals to reconsider whether the controlling issue of Florida law should be certified to the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 4.61 of the Florida Appellate Rules. *Lehman Bros.*, 416 U.S. at 391-92, 94 S.Ct. at 1744. Although the Court cautioned that it was not suggesting that resort to the certification procedure is obligatory where there is doubt as to local law and where the certification procedure is available, it observed that such resort "does... in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." *Lehman Bros.*, 416 U.S. at 390-391, 94 S.Ct. at 1744.

Unlike *Clay* (a constitutional law case), *Lehman Bros., v. Schein* was a diversity case dealing with insider trading, and thus did not require certification as an alternative to abstention. In this respect, the facts here are identical to those in *Lehman Bros.*: as in *Lehman*, this is a diversity case which does not require certification as an alternative to abstention. Further, this case also involves a state law as to which no state appellate court has issued an opinion — as a result of which the court of appeals in this case (as in

Lehman Bros.) ostensibly turned to the law of other jurisdictions to predict how the California Supreme Court would "probably" rule.

Thus this case presents (as both *Clay* and *Lehman Bros.* did) a state law issue of first impression: as such, the court of appeals should have certified the question of whether section 990(n) indeed exempted the use of the Astaire film clips to the California Supreme Court under California Rule of Court 29.5, as expressly asked to do so by Mrs. Astaire in her motion for stay of mandate and petition for rehearing. In failing to do so, the court of appeals acted in contravention of the policy underlying this Court's precedent and its own precedent. Since *Lehman Bros.*, the Supreme Court has used the certification procedure on a number of occasions. For example, in *Belloti v. Baird*, 428 U.S. 132, 96 S.Ct. 2857, 49 L.Ed.2d 844 (1976), the Court held that the three-judge district court should have certified questions as to the construction of a state law there at issue to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court before passing upon its constitutionality, *Bellotti*, 428 U.S. 146-147, 96 S.Ct. 2866. The Court noted that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had adopted a Rule of Court under which an issue of interpretation of Massachusetts law may be certified directly to that court for prompt resolution (namely, Rule 3:21)), *Bellotti*, 428 U.S. 150, 96 S.Ct. 2867.

Similarly, in *Elkins v. Moreno*, 435 U.S. 647, 98 S.Ct. 1338, 55 L.Ed.2nd 1338 (1978), this Court itself certified a question of state law to the Maryland Court of Appeals, even though the parties had not sought such relief and even though the district court and the court of appeals previously had resolved the disputed point of state law. *Elkins*, 435 U.S. at 662, 98 S.Ct. at 1347. The Court concluded that "it is obviously desirable that questions of law which . . . are both intensely local and immensely important to a wide spectrum of state government activities be decided in the

first instance by state courts." *Elkins*, 435 U.S. at 663 n. 16, 98, S.Ct. at 1347 n. 16. Accordingly, the Court certified a state law question to the Court of Appeals of Maryland pursuant to section 12-601 of the Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code. *Elkins*, 435 U.S. at 668, 98 S.Ct. at 1350.

In *Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n*, 484 U.S. 383, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988), this Court certified two state-law questions to the Virginia Supreme Court pursuant to its certification Rule 5:42; in so doing, the Court further observed that certification, in contrast to the more cumbersome and problematic abstention doctrine, is a more expeditious method of obtaining that construction. *Virginia*, 484 U.S. at 396, 108 S.Ct. at 644. Similarly, in *Zant v. Stephens*, 456 U.S. 410, 102 S.Ct. 1856, 72 L.Ed.2d 222 (1982), this Court certified a state law question (concerning imposition of the death penalty) to the Georgia Supreme Court — having noted that the Georgia Supreme Court under certain circumstances will decide questions of state law upon certification from the Court, pursuant to § 4536 of the Ga. Code, *Zant*, 456 U.S. at 416, 102 S.Ct. at 1859.

Likewise, in *Aldrich v. Aldrich*, 375 U.S. 75, 84 S.Ct. 184 (1964), the Court declared *per curiam* that it wished to certify a question to the Florida Supreme Court on the grounds that "there are questions of Florida law that are determinative" of the cause before it, "with respect to which questions there seem to be no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida." *Aldrich*, 375 U.S. at 75, 84 S.Ct. at 185. This Court also certified a state law question on its own motion in *Dresner v. City of Tallahassee*, 375 U.S. 136, 84 S.Ct. 235 (1963) *(per curiam)* (again to the Supreme Court of Florida pursuant to Rule 4.61 of the Florida Appellate Rules), on the ground that there appeared to be no precise controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida. *Ibid.*

Nor is certification of state-law questions to the highest state court a novel procedure within the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. For instance, in *Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc.*, 902 F.2d 1400, 1401-1402 (9th Cir. 1990), Alaska Airlines filed a diversity action in the District of Alaska federal court. The Ninth Circuit panel observed that, in a diversity action, the federal district court must apply the choice of law rules prevailing in the state where the court is located. *Alaska Airlines, Inc.*, 902 F.2d at 1402, citing *Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.*, 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). The district court was thus bound to apply Alaska choice of law; finding that no Alaska cases were directly on point, the Court of Appeals certified three questions to the Alaska Supreme Court in order to resolve determinative issues of state law (despite the fact that neither party requested certification) pursuant to Alaska Appellate Rule 407. *Alaska Airlines, Inc.*, 902 F.2d at 1402.

In *Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co.*, 742 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984), the case before the Court of Appeals presented a pure question of state law — specifically, whether Idaho courts would give effect to an "other owned vehicle" exclusion from the underinsured motorist coverage. Commenting that the case was an appropriate one in which to seek guidance from the Idaho Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals certified the state-law question under that Court's certification procedure (Idaho Appellate Rule 12.1). Idaho Appellate Rule 12.1 was also invoked by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Waters v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.*, 773 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1985), in a case presenting pure questions of state law; despite "diligent research," the court found no Idaho cases on point and was thus unable to ascertain how Idaho courts would answer the questions. Accordingly, the court again commented that this was an "appropriate" case in which to seek guidance from the Idaho Supreme Court under its certification procedure. *Ibid.*

In *Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Company*, 871 F.2d 85, 88 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit again found that it was unable to discern how Idaho courts would decide several important state-law issues; the court thus certified three state-law questions to the Idaho Supreme Court under the aegis of Idaho Appellate Rule 12.1. *Ibid.*

Indeed, in *Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass'n*, 112 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 1997), in an opinion *also* authored by Circuit Judge Wiggin, the court of appeals deemed a question of Nevada law determinative of a party's punitive damages liability; in such a circumstance, the court held, it may exercise its authority to certify the question to the Nevada Supreme Court. It then proceeded to certify the state-law question, and requested the Nevada Supreme Court to exercise its discretionary authority under Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure 5 to accept and decide the question. *Ibid.*

Some guidance as to Ninth Circuit procedure and policy in such matters is provided in *Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc.*, 911 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1990), in which the Ninth Circuit certified two questions of law to the Hawaii Supreme Court pursuant to Hawaii Rule of Appellate Procedure 13, on the ground that the cases presented *important state law issues of first impression.* As *Smith* makes clear, the Ninth Circuit regularly invokes statutory certification devices enacted by state legislatures to assist a federal court in determining state law questions determinative of pending causes; further, it does so in cases presenting *important state law issues of first impression.*

This case is one which, plainly, presents an important state law issue of first impression: the question (thus far never discussed in any California appellate opinion) of whether unauthorized use of the likeness of a deceased celebrity is exempted under section 990(n), is obviously of considerable significance in the state of California (in par-

ticular, southern California), where the film industry is enormously important and wields considerable economic influence. It should be noted in connection with this point that *amicus* briefs were filed on behalf of CBS Inc., Fox, Inc., National Broadcasting Co., Inc. and Warner Bros. in support of Best, while *amicus* briefs in support of Astaire were filed by Mr. and Mrs. Frank Sinatra, Mr. and Mrs. Bob Hope, Charlton Heston, Ms. Katherine Hepburn, the Screen Actors Guild, Inc., American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers and Wayne Enterprises Ltd. (John Wayne). App., *infra*, B-5.

Indeed, Judge Schroeder's example of a fashion videotape introduced by the unauthorized use of footage of Jacqueline Kennedy underscores the scope of the statute and the potential dire implications of the panel majority's construction of its provisions: under the majority's reasoning, the likeness of *any* deceased celebrity may potentially be used, without authorization, to promote the purchase of commercial products. To the extent that *other* state legislatures interested in enacting statutes which purport to balance First Amendment rights with the right of publicity look to section 990 for guidance, the panel majority's interpretation of its exemption provision could play a role unintended by the California legislature that enacted the section originally.

In sum, the question of whether section 990(n) exempts the unauthorized use of a deceased personality's likeness is one which the California Supreme Court is most qualified to resolve.

II.

Given The Panel Majority's Statement That The Statute Is A "Fairly Convoluted Statutory Scheme," The California Supreme Court Should Be Given The Opportunity To Resolve The State Law Question.

The panel that decided this case acknowledged that the provisions set forth in California Civil Code section 990 constitute a "fairly convoluted statutory scheme." In addition, a dissenting member of the panel rejected the majority's interpretation of section 990(n), and offered an alternative reading of the statute. The majority's characterization, along with the presence of a dissenter, raises questions about the lower court's construction and interpretation of section 990(n). More precisely, it is by no means certain the California Supreme Court would adopt the statutory interpretation espoused by the panel majority.

In *White v. Celotex Corp.*, 907 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit denied a motion to certify to the Arizona Supreme Court the question of whether Arizona would adopt the theory of market share liability in asbestos litigation. In denying the motion, the court observed that "[t]here was no reason to certify the question of market share liability to the Supreme Court of Arizona" since there was no evidence the defendants had been in the market at the relevant time. Moreover, the theory of market share liability was not relevant to the asbestos litigation in *White*, for a variety of reasons. *Ibid.* The court of appeals concluded that it was "highly unlikely that the Supreme Court of Arizona would adopt such a theory in the sort of litigation involved. *Ibid.* Since the question was "not close," the "district court did not err in exercising its discretion to deny certification." *Ibid.*

The Ninth Circuit in *White* did not exercise its discretion to certify a state-law issue to the highest state court because

there were no grounds upon which to believe that the issue was a "close" one that required resolution. The facts in this case are clearly different. In Astaire, the panel majority opined that there is a "fairly convoluted statutory scheme," there was, and is, no California appellate court opinion interpreting Civil Code Section 990 and one of the panelists issued a dissenting opinion. This is not a "close" call; certification would have been appropriate. If this question is not certified to the California Supreme Court, either by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals or by this Court, a federal court will have decided an important state law issue of first impression which should have ultimately been decided by the California Supreme Court. This alone justifies exercise of this Court's supervisory power: California Rule of Court 29.5 was enacted *precisely* to enable federal courts to direct matters of state law to the state's highest court; refusal of the court of appeals in this case to defer to the California Supreme Court on an important state-law issue of first impression frustrates the purpose underlying this rule. By vacating the judgment and either remanding for reconsideration of certification to the California Supreme Court, or certifying the state-law issue on its own, this Court will realize the objective of California Rule of Court 29.5.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted, and the state-law issue should be certified (ether by this Court or, on remand, by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) to the California Supreme Court under California Rule of Court 29.5.

Respectfully submitted,

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June 25, 1998

APPENDIX A

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBYN ASTAIRE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BEST FILM & VIDEO CORP.
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-56632
D.C. No.
CV-90-00261-KN

ROBYN ASTAIRE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BEST-FILM & VIDEO CORP.
Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95-56633
D.C. No.
CV-90-00261-KN
OPINION

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David V. Kenyon, District Judge, Presiding.

Argued and Submitted
March 3,1997 — Pasadena, California

Filed June 20, 1997

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Charles E. Wiggins and
Edward Leavy, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wiggins, Dissent by Judge Schroeder

SUMMARY

Intellectual Property/Entertainment

The court of appeals reversed a judgment of the district court. The court held that under California law, a videotape manufacturer may use clips from a deceased entertainer's movies for internal advertising of instructional videotapes under a state statutory exemption for such use in "film."

In 1965, Fred Astaire granted the Ronby Corporation an exclusive license to use his name and likeness in connection with the operation of dance studios, schools, and related activities. Appellee Best Film and Video Corporation agreed with Ronby to produce instructional videotapes using the Astaire name and licenses.

The videos were known as the "Fred Astaire Dance Series." The packaging emphasized their connection with Astaire. Each video contained short film clips from two of Astaire's films in which he is shown dancing.

When Astaire died in 1987, his wife Robyn succeeded to all rights in his name, voice, likeness, and persona under California Civil Code § 990. Section 990(a) provides a cause of action for the owner of such rights who is injured as a result of their unauthorized use "on or in products, merchandise, or goods," or for the purpose of "advertising, or selling, or soliciting" their purchase. Exempted by subsection (n)(1) are use in a film or television program, and by subsection (n)(4), use in an advertisement or commercial announcement for such permitted uses. Best did not have Robyn's authorization to use the Astaire film clips in its videotapes.

Robyn sued Best, alleging that its videotapes violated her rights under § 990. The district court determined that Best's use of the film clips was covered by § 990(a); that is was not a use for "advertising, selling or soliciting"; that it was not exempt under subsection (n); that Robyn's claim was not

preempted by federal copyright law; and that Best's use was not protected by the First Amendment. Both sides appealed.

[1] Although subsection (n)(1) exempts films and television programs. it does not mention videotapes. Language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences the legislature did not intend. **[2]** Interpreting subsection (n)(1) to exempt a film or television program but not a videotape would create an absurd result: a motion picture is exempt when it is shown in a theater or on cable television, but not when someone rents it at a video store and plays it on his VCR. A narrow construction of "film" and "television program" would be inconsistent with subsection (i), which defines "photograph" broadly to include videotape or live television transmission. It would be anomalous if the definition of photograph included a videotape recording of a film, but "film" did not. The term "film" in subsection (n)(1) encompassed Best's videotapes.

[3] Uses listed in subsection (n)(1) are not exempt if they are advertisements or commercial announcements not exempt under subsection (n)(4). Best's use of the Astaire film clips was exempt in either case. **[4]** If it was not an advertisement or a commercial announcement, Best's use was exempt pursuant to subsection (n)(1). If the film clips were advertisements, they were advertisements for the videotapes themselves rather than some other product. Because Best's videotapes were among the uses exempted by subsection (n)(1), subsection (n)(4) provided that even if Best's use of the film clips was an advertisement or commercial announcement, such use was exempt from liability. **[5]** The only plausible reading of subsection (n)(4) is that it exempts advertisements and commercial announcements for uses permitted by the previous subsections.

[6] The evolution of subsection (n) demonstrated that the interpretation of the statute the court of appeals con-

cluded was required by the plain language was consistent with the Legislature's intent. **[7]** Whether the use is intended to increase the marketability of a product cannot be the test for whether it is exempt from § 990 liability. **[8]** Best's use of the Astaire film clips was exempt.

Judge Schroeder dissented, writing that California Civil Code § 990(n)(4) exempts only advertisements or commercial announcements for uses permitted in the preceding paragraphs.

COUNSEL

William E. Wegner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellee-cross-appellant.

George R. Hedges, Hedges & Caldwell, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellant-cross-appellee.

Angela S. Alberts, Theodore J. Minch and Christine M. Sovich, Indianapolis, Indiana, in house counsel for the amicus CMG Worldwide, Inc.

Robert C. Vanderet, Neill S. Jass, O'Melveny & Myers, Los Angeles, California, for the amici CBS Inc., Fox, Inc., National Broadcasting Company, Inc., and Warner Bros.

Dean T. Barnhard, Barnes & Thornberg, Indianapolis, Indiana, Shirley M. Hufstedler, Morrison & Foerster, Los Angeles, California, for the amici Wayne Enterprises Ltd., Wayne Productions, Inc., the Screen Actors Guild, Inc., et al.

OPINION

WIGGINS, Circuit Judge:

Best Film & Video Corporation ("Best") is a New York corporation which manufactures, markets, and distributes

pre-federal district court, alleging *inter alia* that the Best videotapes violated her § 990 rights by using Astaire's image as it appears in the clips from *Second Chorus* and *Royal Wedding* without her permission. Although Mrs. Astaire originally contended otherwise, the parties no longer dispute that Best's use of Astaire's name and the still photographs are authorized under Astaire's agreement with Ronby. Thus, this case focuses entirely on whether § 990 provides Mrs. Astaire with a claim against Best's use of the Astaire film clips.

After several years of proceedings, the district court entered a judgment which made the following legal determinations: (1) Best's use of the Astaire film clips was covered by § 990(a)'s "on or in products, merchandise, or goods" language; (2) Best's use of the Astaire film clips was not a use for "advertising, selling, or soliciting" in violation of § 990(a); (3) Best's use of the Astaire film clips was not exempt under § 990(n); (4) Mrs. Astaire's § 990 claim was not preempted by the federal Copyright Act; and (5) Best's use of Astaire's likeness was not protected by the First Amendment. Both sides appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

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(1) A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement not exempt under paragraph (4).

(2) Material that is of political or newsworthy value.

(3) Single and original works of fine art.

(4) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted by paragraph (1), (2), or (3).

Cal. Civ. Code § 990 (West Supp. 1997).

DISCUSSION

I. *Standard of Review*

We review the district court's decision on an issue of state law under the same de novo standard applied to decisions of recorded videotapes. Robyn Astaire ("Mrs. Astaire") is the widow of the legendary performer Fred Astaire. Mrs. Astaire sued Best in federal district court, alleging that Best's use of her late husband's image in a series of dance instructional videotapes violated her statutory right to control such use under California law. Although the district court concluded that Astaire's image was not used for the purpose of advertising, selling, or soliciting the purchase of the videotapes, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Astaire. Both sides appeal. Concluding that Best's use of Astaire's image is exempt from liability pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 990(n), we reverse.

BACKGROUND

In 1965, Fred Astaire granted the Ronby Corporation ("Ronby") an exclusive license to use his name in connection with the operation of dance studios, schools, and related activities. Astaire also granted Ronby the right to use certain pictures, photographs, and other likenesses of himself as had been used under a previous agreement, as well as any new photographs and likenesses that he approved in writing.

Twenty-four years later, Best entered into an agreement with Ronby to produce a series of dance instructional videotapes using the Fred Astaire Dance Studios name and licenses. Since October 1989, Best has been manufacturing and distributing a series of five videotapes known as the "Fred Astaire Dance Series." The videotapes are each about thirty minutes long and provide instruction in a type of dancing, with titles such as "Swing," "Latin Dancing," and "Ballroom."

Each videotape is packaged in a box prominently labelled "Fred Astaire Franchised Dance Studios" on every side. The back of the box features the following quote attributed to Astaire: "Some people feel that good dancers are born. All the good dancers I've known have been taught or trained." The back also contains a description of the videotape that refers to Astaire as "the master" and "the world's greatest dancer."

The videotape itself begins with an introductory segment. After Best's logo is shown, the title "Fred Astaire Dance Studios Presents How to Dance Series" appears on the screen. Then, before any other footage or narration, the videotape contains about ninety seconds of footage from two of Astaire's films — *Second Chorus* and *Royal Wedding* — in which Astaire is shown dancing alone and with a partner ("the Astaire film clips"). Some still photographs of Astaire follow, and then a narrator appears on a stage adorned with more Astaire photographs. The narrator then introduces the series and the instructional portion of the video.

Fred Astaire died in 1987. He was survived by his wife, Robyn, who has succeeded to all rights in his name, voice, signature, photograph, likeness and persona under Cal. Civ. Code § 990.[1] In 1989, Mrs. Astaire sued Best and others in

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[1] Section 990 provides, in relevant part:

(a) Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for the purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services, without prior consent from the person or persons specified in subdivision (c), shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof . . . .

(h) As used in this section, "deceased personality" means any natural persons whose name, voice, signature, photographs, or likeness has commercial value at the time of his or her death . . . .

(i) As used in this section, "photograph" means any photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any video tape or live

federal law. *Mastro v. Witt,* 39 F.3d 238, 241 (9th Cir. 1994). For questions of California law, we must apply the law as we believe the California Supreme Court would apply it. *Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,* 952 F.2d 1551, 1556 (9th Cir. 1991). In the absence of a California Supreme Court decision, we must predict how the California Supreme Court would decide the issue using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises and restatements as guidance. *Lewis v. Telephone Employees Credit Union,* 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir. 1996).

II. *Section 990*

Many of the parties' arguments focus on § 990. Best argues that the district court erred when it concluded that its use of the Astaire film clips violated the "on or in products, merchandise, or goods" prong of the statute. Best also contends that the district court erred when it concluded that its use of the Astaire film clips was not exempt under subsection (n). Mrs. Astaire argues that the district court erred when it concluded that Best's use of the Astaire film clips did not violate the "advertising, selling, or soliciting" prong of subsection (a). We first address Best's subsection (n) argument, because if Best's use is exempt from § 990 liability altogether, we need not reach the other issues presented by this case.

We begin by reviewing California law on statutory interpretation. The California Supreme Court recently stated that "[the] first task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of

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television transmission, of any person, such that the deceased personality is readily identifiable . . . .

(n) This section shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any of the following instances:

the law." *Quintano v. Mercury Cas. Co.*, 906 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Cal. 1995). This process of apprehending the legislature's intent sensibly starts with the statute's language:

> In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. . . . The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.

Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n., 743 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Cal. 1987).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of the statute. Section 990(n) provides:

> (n) This section shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any of the following instances:
>
> (1) A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement not exempt under paragraph (4).
>
> (2) Material that is of political or newsworthy value.
>
> (3) Single and original works of fine art.
>
> (4) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted by paragraph (1), (2), or (3).

Cal. Civ. Code § 990(n).

Giving this language its ordinary and usual meaning, this provision tells us that the following uses are exempt from § 990 liability: use in a play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program; use in material that is of political or newsworthy value; use in single and original works of fine art; and use in an advertisement or commercial announcement for any of the aforementioned uses. However, subsection (n)(1) limits the exemption for use in a play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program: such uses are not exempt if they are advertisements or commercial announcements. However, that limitation is also limited: such advertisements or commercial announcements may still be exempt under subsection (n)(4), the provision which exempts advertisements and commercial announcements for the uses described in subsections (n)(1), (n)(2), and (n)(3). Thus, to determine whether a use is exempt under subsection (n)(1) requires reference to subsection (n)(4), which in turn refers back to subsections (n)(1), (n)(2). and (n)(3).

Given this fairly convoluted statutory scheme, a few examples help us determine what these provisions mean:

Example 1. Suppose someone writes a magazine article about the history of television that uses a deceased personality's name without authorization. Neither the writer nor the magazine publisher could be sued under § 990: the writer's use of the deceased personality's name would be exempt from § 990 liability pursuant to subsection (n)(1).

Example 2. Suppose that an automobile manufacturer wanted to advertise its latest model in the same magazine with a splashy color layout that included the picture of a deceased personality. Although the use appears in a magazine, the use of the deceased personality's photograph would not be exempt under subsection (n)(1) because it appears in an advertisement. The use is not permitted in subsections

(n)(1), (n)(2), or (n)(3), so it is not exempt under subsection (n)(4).

Example 3. Suppose that the magazine publisher from Example I wanted to advertise its magazine by referring to various articles that had appeared within its pages, including the article about the history of cinema. If that advertisement used the deceased personality's name, that use would be exempt under subsection (n)(4), because the advertisement was for a magazine, a use permitted by subsection (n)(1).

[1] With these examples in mind, we turn to Best's use of the Astaire film clips. Best's use of the Astaire film clips appears on a pre-recorded videotape. Although subsection (n)(1) exempts films and television programs, it does not mention videotapes. Ordinarily, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the indicia of the intent of the legislature. *Lungren v. Deukmejian,* 755 P.2d 299, 303-04 (Cal. 1988). However, this "plain meaning" rule "does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose." *Id. at 304. "It is a settled rule of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend." Younger v. Superior Court*, 577 P.2d 1014, 1021-22 (Cal. 1978). "The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read so to conform to the spirit of the act." *Lungren*, 755 P.2d at 304.

[2] Interpreting subsection (n)(1) to exempt a film or television program but not a videotape creates an absurd result: a motion picture is exempt from § 990 liability when it is shown in a theater or on cable television but not when someone rents it at a video store and plays it on his VCR. Moreover, a narrow construction of "film" and "television program" would be inconsistent with § 990(i), which defines "photograph" broadly to include "any photographic

reproduction, still or moving, of any video tape or live television transmission . . . such that the deceased personality is readily identifiable." It would be anomalous if the definition of photograph included a videotape recording of a film but "film" did not. Consequently, we conclude that the California Supreme Court would not adhere to the literal language of subsection (n)(1); rather, we conclude that the term "film" in subsection (n)(1) encompasses Best's prerecorded videotapes.

[3] However, our inquiry is not yet complete. As Example 2 illustrates, a use is not automatically exempt because it is listed in the first part of subsection (n)(1). The uses listed in the first part of subsection (n)(1) are not exempt if they are "advertisement[s] or commercial announcement[s] not exempt under [subsection] (n)(4)." The parties dispute whether Best's use of the Astaire film clips is an advertisement or commercial announcement. We need not resolve this dispute, however, because Best's use of the Astaire film clips is exempt from liability in either case.

[4] If Best's use of the Astaire film clips is not an advertisement or commercial announcement, then the second part of subsection (n)(1) does not apply. Accordingly, Best's use is exempt from liability pursuant to subsection (n)(1). If, however, we assume for argument's sake that Best's use of the Astaire film clips is an advertisement or commercial announcement, Best's use is still exempt from liability. If the Astaire film clips are an advertisement, they are certainly an advertisement for the videotapes themselves rather than some other product. As Example 3 illustrates, subsection (n)(4) exempts advertisements and commercial announcements for uses permitted in subsections (n)(1), (n)(2), and (n)(3). Because Best's videotapes are among the uses exempted by the first part of subsection (n)(1), subsection (n)(4) provides that even if Best's use of the

Astaire film clips is an advertisement or commercial announcement, such a use is exempt from liability.

[5] Mrs. Astaire argues that even if videotapes are covered by the first part of subsection (n)(1), Best's use of the Astaire film clips is not exempt because such a use is an advertisement or commercial announcement. Mrs. Astaire's argument, however, ignores the last five words of subsection (n)(1), which refer to subsection (n)(4). We are not free to ignore this language, because we must attempt to give each part of the statute significance. The only plausible reading of subsection (n)(4) is that it exempts advertisements and commercial announcements for the uses permitted by the preceding three subsections.

In sum, we conclude that when subsection (n) is read in its entirety, the only interpretation of its plain language which is internally consistent and gives effect to each phrase and clause of the provisions leads to the conclusion that Best's use of the Astaire film clips is exempt. Rather than end the inquiry here, however, under California law we must determine whether the meaning of the plain language comports with the legislature's purpose.

Mrs. Astaire asserts that the legislative history of Senate Bill 613 ("SB 613"), the legislation which enacted § 990 in 1984, supports the district court's conclusion that subsection (n)(1) creates a limited exception for "legitimate historical, fictional, and biographical accounts of deceased celebrities." Mrs. Astaire asserts that because the Astaire film clips were included in Best's videotapes to make them more attractive and salable, the exemption of subsection (n)(1) does not apply.

To support her argument that the Legislature intended subsection (n)(1)'s exemption to be limited to legitimate historical, biographical, and fictional works, Mrs. Astaire principally relies on several letters written by the author of

SB 613. No matter how illuminating we might find these letters, California law generally prevents us from "consider[ing] the motives or understandings of an individual legislator even if he or she authored the statute." *Williams v. Garcetti*, 853 P.2d 507, 510 (Cal. 1993) (quoting *Delaney v. Superior Court*, 789 P.2d 734, 743 n-12 (Cal. 1990)). As a result, we may not consider the various letters written by the author of SB 613.

We may consider, however, "the history of the statute, committee reports, and staff bill reports . . . to determine the intent of the Legislature." *DeCastro West Chodorow & Burns, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 792, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). We may also consider the evolution of a proposed statute after its original introduction in the California State Senate or Assembly, as such evolution may "offer considerable enlightenment as to legislative intent." *People v. Goodloe*, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 15, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).

As originally introduced, SB 613 did not contain § 990 at all, instead focusing on modifications to existing statutory provisions to create a right of publicity for the heirs and descendents of deceased personalities. After the bill was passed by the Senate, however, it was amended in the Assembly several times. On June 12, 1984, § 990(n) appeared for the first time in the amended legislation. It read:

> Nothing in this section shall be construed to derogate from any rights protected by constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech or freedom of the Press, such as the right to use a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in a play, book, magazine, newspaper, film, television program, or similar medium of expression, to the extent the use is protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech or freedom of the press.

S.B. 613, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1984) (hereinafter "S.B. 613") (as amended June 12, 1984).

A staff report on this version of SB 613 criticized this language for being superfluous: "[i]rrespective of this stated intent, a defendant who has used a person's name, voice, etc. without authorization may assert a First Amendment privilege." Staff of Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., *Report on S.B. 613 (Campbell) As Amended 6/12/84* at 6 (Cal. 1984). Shortly thereafter, § 990(n) was amended to its current version, which does not contain the language explicitly limiting the scope of its exemption to constitutionally protected uses. *See S.B. 613* (as amended July 3, 1984).

[6] The Legislature's removal of the language "to the extent the use is protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech or freedom of the press" from SB 613 is a telling clue as to the Legislature's intent. By deleting this language, the Legislature demonstrated an intent to adopt a broader exemption that was not limited to constitutionally protected uses. In other words, the evolution of subsection (n) demonstrates that the interpretation of the statute we conclude is required by the plain language is consistent with the Legislature's intent.

The same staff report on SB 613 describes the bill generally as follows:

> [T]he bill is intended to address circumstances in which (a) commercial gain is had through the exploitation of the name, voice, signature, photograph. or likeness of a celebrity of public figure in the marketing of goods or services or (b) a celebrity or public figure is subjected to abuse or ridicule in the form of a marketed product. Such goods or services typically involved the use of a *deceased* celebrity's name or likeness, e.g., on posters, T-shirts, porcelain plates, and other collectibles; in toys, gadgets, and other merchandise; in look-alike services.

Staff of Assembly Comm, on Judiciary, *supra*, at 3-4. Several other legislative staff reports describe the legislation similarly. *See. e.g.*, Assembly Office of Research, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., *Report on S.B. 613 (Campbell) As Amended 8/9/84* at 3 (Cal. 1984).

To the extent these reports reflect the Legislature's intent when it enacted § 990, our conclusion that Best's use of the Astaire film clips is exempt from liability is not inconsistent with this expressed intent. Best's use in no possible way subjects Fred Astaire to abuse or ridicule. Best's use is also nothing like the exploitative marketing uses described in these legislative staff reports.

[7] We recognize, however, that Best placed these film clips in its videotapes for a reason: to make the videotapes more salable. Nevertheless, neither the statute nor the legislative history provides any support for treating Best's use of the Astaire film clips any differently from the use of the same clips in a documentary about dance in film, a use that Mrs. Astaire concedes would be exempt from liability. In short, whether the use is included to increase the marketability of a product cannot be the test of whether it is exempt from § 990 liability.

[8] Having considered what limited guidance the legislative history of SB 613 gives us regarding the meaning of subsection (n), we conclude that the legislative history does not support Mrs. Astaire's contentions that the exception for use in a "play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program" is limited to "legitimate historical, fictional, and biographical accounts of deceased celebrities." We conclude that the language of subsection (n) should be given its ordinary and usual

meaning, and that Best's use of the Astaire film clips is accordingly exempt.[2]

CONCLUSION

We conclude that Best's use of the late Fred Astaire's likeness/photograph in its "How to Dance" videotapes is exempt from § 990 liability pursuant to subsection (n).[3] Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed and we remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Best.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:

I dissent from the majority's conclusion that this use of Fred Astaire's legendary film performances, to preface a videotape having nothing to do with Fred Astaire, is exempt under the California statute. I dissent with respect, however, because the statute is not as clear as judges would like.

First I assume, without needing to decide, that the majority is correct in holding that subsection (n)(1) of Cal. Civ. Code § 990 exempts uses in videotapes, as well as in films, plays and other forms of expression, even though the statute

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[2]Construing subsection (n) to exempt Best's use of the Astaire film clips also has the commendable effect of avoiding the potential First Amendment concern which would be created were Best held liable for using the film clips in an original videotape. Under California's principles of statutory construction, a construction which best avoids conflict with constitutional limitations is favored. *See J. A. Savage v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.*, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).

[3]Having concluded that Best's use of the Astaire film clips is exempt from liability under § 990, we need not reach the other issues presented by the parties' arguments, *viz.*, whether Best's use is covered by § 990(a), whether Mrs. Astaire's § 990 claim is preempted by the federal Copyright Act, and whether holding Best liable violates the First Amendment.

does not expressly refer to videotapes. In my view, the majority goes wrong when it holds that this use of the Astaire footage is exempt as an "advertisement or commercial announcement" of an exempt use.

The majority reasons that the language of subsection (n)(4) exempts all advertisements or commercial announcements for plays, films, videotapes, etc. This is incorrect. That subsection exempts only advertisements or commercial announcements for uses permitted in the earlier paragraphs. The relevant exemption in this case must be the exemption in paragraph (1) for use of an image or likeness in a videotape, film, play or other expressive form. This footage of Astaire, however, is not used in the dance instruction video. The clips are used to promote the accompanying videotape of dance instruction that does not use Astaire's image. Had the clips been used in an announcement physically separated from the rest of the video, the use of the clips would clearly not have been exempt. The fact that Best chose to attach the clips to the dance instruction video in the form of a prefatory announcement does not change its essential nature: a commercial announcement of something unrelated to any exempted use of a photograph or likeness. The clips are therefore not advertising or announcing a "use permitted by paragraph (1)," and thus they are not exempt under paragraph (4).

Under the majority's reasoning one could with impunity hawk a videotape on fashion for the next century by introducing it with footage of Jacqueline Kennedy. The statute

was intended to prevent such exploitation, not immunize it. I therefore must respectfully dissent.

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APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBYN ASTAIRE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
BEST FILM & VIDEO CORP.,
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-56632
D.C. No.
CV-90-00261-KN-A

ROBYN ASTAIRE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BEST-FILM & VIDEO CORP.,
Defendant-Appellee.

No. 95-56633
D.C. No.
CV-90-00261-KN-A
ORDER AND
AMENDED OPINION

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David V. Kenyon, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted
March 3, 1997 — Pasadena, California

Filed June 20, 1997
Amended February 19, 1998

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Charles E. Wiggins and
Edward Leavy, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wiggins; Dissent by Judge Schroeder

SUMMARY

Intellectual Property/Entertainment

The court of appeals reversed a judgment of the district court. The court held that under California law, a videotape producer may use clips from a deceased entertainer's movies for internal advertising of instructional videotapes under a state statutory exemption for such use in "film."

In 1965, Fred Astaire granted the Ronby Corporation an exclusive license to use his name and likeness in connection with the operation of dance studios, schools, and related activities. Appellee Best Film and Video Corporation agreed with Ronby to produce instructional videotapes using the Astaire name and licenses.

The videos were known as the "Fred Astaire Dance Series." The packaging emphasized their connection with Astaire. Each video contained short film clips from two of Astaire's films in which he is shown dancing.

When Astaire died in 1987, his wife Robyn succeeded to all rights in his name, voice, likeness, and persona under California Civil Code § 990. Section 990(a) provides a cause of action for the owner of such rights who is injured as a result of their unauthorized use "on or in products, merchandise, or goods," or for the purpose of "advertising, or selling, or soliciting" their purchase. Exempted by subsection (n)(1) are use in a film or television program, and by subsection (n)(4), use in an advertisement or commercial announcement for such permitted uses. Best did not have Robyn's authorization to use the Astaire film clips in its videotapes.

Robyn sued Best, alleging that its videotapes violated her rights under § 990. The district court determined that Best's use of the film clips was covered by § 990(a); that is was not a use for "advertising, selling or soliciting"; that it was not exempt under subsection (n); that Robyn's claim was not

preempted by federal copyright law; and that Best's use was not protected by the First Amendment. Both sides appealed.

[1] Although subsection (n)(1) exempts films and television programs, it does not mention videotapes. Language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences the legislature did not intend.

[2] Interpreting subsection (n)(1) to exempt a film or television program but not a videotape would create an absurd result: a motion picture is exempt when it is shown in a theater or on cable television, but not when someone rents it at a video store and plays it on his VCR. A narrow construction of "film" and "television program" would be inconsistent with subsection (i), which defines "photograph" broadly to include videotape or live television transmission. It would be anomalous if the definition of photograph included a videotape recording of a film, but "film" did not. The term "film" in subsection (n)(1) encompassed Best's videotapes.

[3] Uses listed in subsection (n)(1) are not exempt if they are advertisements or commercial announcements not exempt under subsection (n)(4). Best's use of the Astaire film clips was exempt in either case.

[4] If it was not an advertisement or a commercial announcement, Best's use was exempt pursuant to subsection (n)(1). If the film clips were advertisements, they were advertisements for the videotapes themselves rather than some other product. Because Best's videotapes were among the uses exempted by subsection (n)(1), subsection (n)(4) provided that even if Best's use of the film clips was an advertisement or commercial announcement, such use was exempt from liability.

[5] Assuming that the clips were only an advertisement, it is not reasonable to conclude that the video itself did not

contain the film clips. The Astaire film clips were clearly part of the video. Even if the rest of the video were considered separately, there was use of Astaire's persona within it, since his name and stills from his movies were prominently displayed.

[6] The court of appeals' holding was narrow, and driven by the unusual facts that Astaire had licensed the use of his name to the dance studios, and that the film clips of Astaire dancing, which were in the public domain, were used in a how-to-dance video.

[7] The evolution of subsection (n) demonstrated that the interpretation of the statute the court of appeals concluded was required by the plain language was consistent with the Legislature's intent.

[8] Whether the use is intended to increase the marketability of a product cannot be the test for whether it is exempt from § 990 liability.

[9] Best's use of the Astaire film clips was exempt.

Judge Schroeder dissented, writing that California Civil Code § 990(n)(4) exempts only advertisements or commercial announcements for uses permitted in the preceding paragraphs.

COUNSEL

William E. Wegner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellee-cross-appellant.

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Dean T. Barnhard, Barnes & Thornberg, Indianapolis, Indiana, Shirley M. Hufstedler, Morrison & Foerster, Los Angeles, California, for amici Wayne Enterprises Ltd., Wayne Productions, Inc., the Screen Actors Guild, Inc., et al.

ORDER

The slip opinion filed on June 20, 1997, is amended as follows.

1. Add at slip opinion page 7178, end of the first full paragraph, the following footnote:

> In her petition for rehearing, Mrs. Astaire argues that we have improperly decided the case on a ground neither raised below nor briefed in this court. This argument is plainly incorrect. The record below discloses that Best raised § 990(n) as a defense, Best's arguments were quickly and summarily rejected by the district court. *See* Appellant's Excerpt of Record at 5, 65, 93. Moreover, Best's opening brief to this court prominently featured the § 990(n) argument. *See* Appellant's Opening Brief at 7-11.
>
> We admit that our interpretation of § 990(n) was not offered by any of the parties. But that does not make it improper or any less correct. This court can interpret a statute de novo on appeal; it is not required merely to choose between the opposing interpretations offered by the parties.

2. On slip op. p. 7180, change "that limitation is also limited" to "that limitation is itself limited."

3. On slip op. p. 7182-83, remove the last paragraph on page 7182 and replace it with the following:

> Under Mrs. Astaire's proposed interpretation, § 990(n)(1) "exempts certain non-advertising uses from liability, and § 990(n)(4) exempts advertisements *for those non-advertising uses.*" Petition for Rehearing at 9. This interpretation is contrary to the language of § 990(n)(1), which clearly includes as exempt certain advertising uses — those exempt under § 990(n)(4). Mrs. Astaire tries to convince us to ignore the final words of § 990(n)(1). We cannot.
>
> Mrs. Astaire, herself notes that "if a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to the more reasonable result will be followed." *Lungren v. Deukmejian,* 755 P.2d 299, 304 (Cal. 1988). However, we cannot consider her interpretation, which ignores the language in § 990(n)(1), to be the more reasonable. She wishes us to hold that the clip's of Astaire dancing at the start of the video are not connected to the content of the learn-to-dance video and, therefore, are merely an advertisement for the video. She contends then that the advertisement is a distinct entity analytically, separate from the video. Thus, under her interpretation, there would be no "use" of Astaire's persona in the video itself that would fall under § 990(n)(1). Even assuming for the sake of argument that the clips are only an advertisement, we do not think it is reasonable to conclude that the video itself did not contain the film clips. The Astaire film clips are clearly part of the video. In addition, even if we were to consider the rest of the video separately, there was use of Astaire's persona within it, since his name and stills from his movies were prominently displayed.
>
> Mrs. Astaire raises the spectre of a "draconian" destruction of "legitimate publicity rights" under our interpretation of § 990, suggesting that a celebrity's name and

photograph could now be used freely to advertise any film, however unconnected to the celebrity. That is not so. Our holding in this case is narrow and driven by the unusual facts that Astaire had licensed the use of his name to the dance studios and that the film clips of Astaire dancing, clips which were in the public domain, were used in a how-to-dance video. The absurdity Mrs. Astaire claims will arise from our interpretation would in reality arise from hers, She is asking courts to make a content-based decision every time a filmmaker or author uses the name or image of a celebrity, "Is this use of his name related to the content of this book, or is it merely advertising used to call attention to the book?" Not only would this create great uncertainty in the law, but there is no suggestion within § 990 or its legislative history that the California state legislature intended such an inquiry.

SO ORDERED.

OPINION

WIGGINS, Circuit Judge:

Best Film & Video Corporation ("Best") is a New York corporation which manufactures, markets, and distributes. prerecorded videotapes. Robyn Astaire ("Mrs. Astaire") is the widow of the legendary performer Fred Astaire. Mrs. Astaire sued Best in federal district court, alleging that Best's use of her late husband's image in a series of dance instructional videotapes violated her statutory right to control such use under California law. Although the district court concluded that Astaire's image was not used for the purpose of advertising, selling, or soliciting the purchase of the videotapes, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mrs. Astaire. Both sides appeal. Concluding that Best's use of Astaire's image is exempt from liability pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 990(n), we reverse.

BACKGROUND

In 1965, Fred Astaire granted the Ronby Corporation ("Ronby") an exclusive license to use his name in connection with the operation of dance studios, schools, and related activities. Astaire also granted Ronby the right to use certain pictures, photographs, and other likenesses of himself as had been used under a previous agreement, as well as any new photographs and likenesses that he approved in writing.

Twenty-four years later, Best entered into an agreement with Ronby to produce a series of dance instructional videotapes using the Fred Astaire Dance Studios name and licenses. Since October 1989, Best has been manufacturing and distributing a series of five videotapes known as the "Fred Astaire Dance Series." The videotapes are each about thirty minutes long and provide instruction in a type of dancing, with titles such as "Swing," "Latin Dancing," and "Ballroom."

Each videotape is packaged in a box prominently labelled "Fred Astaire Franchised Dance Studios" on every side. The back of the box features the following quote attributed to Astaire. "Some people feel that good dancers are born. All the good dancers I've known have been taught or trained." The back also contains a description of the videotape that refers to Astaire as "the master" and "the world's greatest dancer."

The videotape itself begins with an introductory segment. After Best's logo is shown, the title "Fred Astaire Dance Studios Presents How to Dance Series" appears on the screen. Then, before any other footage or narration, the videotape contains about ninety seconds of footage from two of Astaire's films — *Second Chorus and Royal Wedding* — in which Astaire is shown dancing alone and with a partner ("the Astaire film clips"). Some still photographs of Astaire follow, and then a narrator appears on a stage adorned with

more Astaire photographs. The narrator then introduces the series and the instructional portion of the video.

Fred Astaire died in 1987. He was survived by his wife, Robyn, who has succeeded to all rights in his name, voice, signature, photograph, likeness and persona under Cal. Civ. Code § 990.[1] In 1989, Mrs. Astaire sued Best and others in federal district court, alleging *inter alia* that the Best videotapes violated her § 990 rights by using Astaire's image as it appears in the clips from *Second Chorus and Royal Wedding* without her permission. Although Mrs. Astaire originally contended otherwise, the parties no longer dispute that Best's use of Astaire's name and the still photographs are

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[1]Section 990 provides, in relevant part:

(a) Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for the purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services, without prior consent from the person or persons specified in subdivision (c), shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof. . . .

(h) As used in this section, "deceased personality" means any natural person whose name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial value at the time of his or her death. . . .

(i) As used in this section, "photograph" means any photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any video tape or live television transmission, of any person, such that the deceased personality is readily identifiable. . . .

(n) This section shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in. any of the following instances:

(1) A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement not exempt under paragraph (4).

(2) Material that is or political or newsworthy value.

(3) Single and original works of fine art.

(4) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted by paragraph (1), (2), or (3).

Cal. Civ. Code § 990 (West Supp. 1997).

authorized under Astaire's agreement with Ronby. Thus, this case focuses entirely on whether § 990 provides Mrs. Astaire with a claim against Best's use of the Astaire film clips.

After several years of proceedings, the district court entered a judgment which made the following legal determinations: (1) Best's use of the Astaire film clips was covered by § 990(a)'s "on or in products, merchandise, or goods" language; (2) Best's use of the Astaire film clips was not a use for "advertising, selling, or soliciting" in violation of § 990(a); (3) Best's use of the Astaire film clips was not exempt under § 990(n); (4) Mrs. Astaire's § 990 claim was not preempted by the federal Copyright Act; and (5) Best's use of Astaire's likeness was not protected by the First Amendment. Both sides appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

DISCUSSION

I. *Standard of Review*

We review the district court's decision on an issue of state law under the same de novo standard applied to decisions of federal law, *Mastro v. Witt,* 39 F.3d 238, 241 (9th Cir. 1994). For questions of California law, we must apply the law as we believe the California Supreme Court would apply it. *Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,* 952 F.2d 1551, 1556 (9th Cir. 1991). In the absence of a California Supreme Court decision, we must predict how the California Supreme Court would decide the issue using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes, treatises and restatements as guidance. *Lewis v. Telephone Employees Credit Union,* 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir. 1996).

II. *Section 990*

Many of the parties' arguments focus on § 990. Best argues that the district court erred when it concluded that its use of the Astaire film clips violated the "on or in products, merchandise, or goods" prong of the statute. Best also contends that the district court erred when it concluded that its use of the Astaire film clips was not exempt under subsection (n). Mrs. Astaire argues that the district court erred when it concluded that Best's use of the Astaire film clips did not violate the "advertising, selling, or soliciting" prong of subsection (a). We first address Best's subsection (n) argument, because if Best's use is exempt from § 990 liability altogether, we need not reach the other issues presented by this case.[2]

We begin by reviewing California law on statutory, interpretation. The California Supreme Court recently stated that "[the] first task in construing a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." *Quintano v. Mercury Cas. Co.*, 906 P.2d 1057,

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[2]In her petition for rehearing, Mrs. Astaire argues that we have improperly decided the case on a ground neither raised below nor briefed in this court. This argument is plainly incorrect. The record below discloses that Best raised § 990(n) as a defense; Best's arguments were quickly and summarily rejected by the district court. *See* Appellant's Excerpt of Record at 5, 65, 93. Moreover, Best's opening brief to this court prominently featured the § 990(n) argument. *See* Appellant's Opening Brief at 7-11.

We admit that our interpretation of § 990(n) was not offered by any of the parties. But that does not make it improper or any less correct. This court can interpret a statute de novo on appeal; it is not required merely to choose between the opposing interpretations offered by the parties.

1060. (Cal. 1995). This process of apprehending the legislature's intent sensibly starts with the statute's language:

> In determining such intent, a court must look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose. . . . The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible.

Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n., 743 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Cal. 1987).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of the statute. Section 990(n) provides:

> (n) This section shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any of the following instances:
>
> (1) A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement not exempt under paragraph (4).
>
> (2) Material that is of political or newsworthy value.
>
> (3) Single and original works of fine art,
>
> (4) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted by paragraph (1), (2), or (3).

Cal. Civ. Code § 990(n).

Giving this language its ordinary and usual meaning, this provision tells us that the following uses are exempt from § 990 liability: use in a play, book, magazine, newspaper, music composition, film, radio or television program; use in material that's of political or newsworthy value, use in single

and original works of fine art; and use in an advertisement or commercial announcement for any of the aforementioned uses. However, subsection (n)(1) limits the exemption for use in a play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program: such uses are not exempt if they are advertisements or commercial announcements. However, that limitation is itself limited: such advertisements or commercial announcements may still be exempt under subsection (n)(4), the provision which exempts advertisements and commercial announcements for the uses described in subsections (n)(1), (n)(2), and (n)(3). Thus, to determine whether a use is exempt under subsection (n)(1) requires reference to subsection (n)(4), which in turn refers back to subsections (n)(1), (n)(2), and (n)(3).

Given this fairly convoluted statutory scheme, a few examples help us determine what these provisions mean:

Example 1. Suppose someone writes a magazine article about the history of television that uses a deceased personality's name without authorization. Neither the writer nor the magazine publisher could be sued under § 990: the writer's use of the deceased personality's name would be exempt from § 990 liability pursuant to subsection (n)(1).

Example 2. Suppose that an automobile manufacturer wanted to advertise its latest model in the same magazine with a splashy color layout that included the picture of a deceased personality. Although the use appears in a magazine, the use of the deceased personality's photograph would not be exempt under subsection (n)(1) because it appears in an advertisement. The use is not permitted in subsections (n)(1), (n)(2), or (n)(3), so it is not exempt under subsection (n)(4).

Example 3. Suppose that the magazine publisher from Example 1 wanted to advertise its magazine by referring to

various articles that had appeared within its pages, including the article about the history of cinema. If that advertisement used the deceased personality's name, that use would be exempt under subsection (n)(4), because the advertisement was for a magazine, a use permitted by subsection (n)(1).

[1] With these examples in mind, we turn to Best's use of the Astaire film clips, Best's use of the Astaire film clips appears on a pre-recorded videotape. Although subsection (n)(1) exempts films and television programs, it does not mention videotapes. Ordinarily, if the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to the indicia of the intent of the legislature. *Lungren v. Deukmejian,* 755 P.2d 299, 303-04 (Cal. 1988). However, this "plain meaning" rule "does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose." *Id.* at 304. "It is a settled rule of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend." *Younger v. Superior Court,* 577 P.2d 1014, 1021-22 (Cal. 1978). "The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read so to conform to the spirit of the act." *Lungren,* 755 P.2d at 304.

[2] Interpreting subsection (n)(1) to exempt a film or television program but not a videotape creates an absurd result: a motion picture is exempt from § 990 liability when it is shown in a theater or on cable television but not when someone rents it at a video store and plays it on his VCR. Moreover, a narrow construction of "film" and "television program" would be inconsistent with § 990(i), which defines "photograph" broadly to include "any photographic reproduction, still or moving, of any video tape or live television transmission . . . such that the deceased personality is readily identifiable." It would be anomalous if the definition of photograph included a videotape recording of a

film but "film" did not. Consequently, we conclude that the California Supreme Court would not adhere to the literal language of subsection (n)(1); rather, we conclude that the term "film" in subsection (n)(1) encompasses Best's prerecorded videotapes.

[3] However, our inquiry is not yet complete. As Example 2 illustrates, a use is not automatically exempt because it is listed in the first part of subsection (n)(1). The uses listed in the first part of subsection (n)(1) are not exempt if they are "advertisement[s] or commercial announcement[s] not exempt under [subsection] (n)(4)." The parties dispute whether Best's use of the Astaire film clips is an advertisement or commercial announcement. We need not resolve this dispute, however, because Best's use of the Astaire film clips is exempt from liability in either case.

[4] If Best's use of the Astaire film clips is not an advertisement or commercial announcement, then the second part of subsection (n)(1) does not apply. Accordingly, Best's use is exempt from liability pursuant to subsection (n)(1). If, however, we assume for argument's sake that Best's use of the Astaire film clips is an advertisement or commercial announcement, Best's use is still exempt from liability. If the Astaire film clips are an advertisement, they are certainly an advertisement for the videotapes themselves rather than some other product. As Example 3 illustrates, subsection (n)(4) exempts advertisements and commercial announcements for uses permitted in subsections (n)(1), (n)(2) and (n)(3), Because Best's videotapes are among the uses exempted by the first part of subsection (n)(1), subsection (n)(4) provides that even if Best's use of the Astaire film clips is an advertisement or commercial announcement, such a use is exempt from liability.

Under Mrs. Astaire's proposed interpretation, § 990(n)(1) "exempts certain non-advertising uses from liability, and § 990(n)(4) exempts advertisements for those

non-advertising uses." Petition for Rehearing at 9. This interpretation is contrary to the language of § 990(n)(1), which clearly includes as exempt certain advertising uses — those exempt under § 990(n)(4). Mrs. Astaire tries to convince us to ignore the final words of § 990(n)(1). We cannot.

[5] Mrs. Astaire herself notes that "if a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, the one that leads to the more reasonable result will be followed." *Lungren v. Deukmejian,* 755 P.2d 299, 304 (Cal. 1988). However, we cannot consider her interpretation, which ignores the language in § 990(n)(1), to be the more reasonable. She wishes us to hold that the clips of Astaire dancing at the start of the video are not connected to the content of the learn-to-dance video and, therefore, are merely an advertisement for the video. She contends then that the advertisement is a distinct entity analytically, separate from the video. Thus, under her interpretation, there would be no "use" of Astaire's persona in the video itself that would fall under § 990(n)(1). Even assuming for the sake of argument that the clips are only an advertisement, we do not think it is reasonable to conclude that the video itself did not contain the film clips. The Astaire film clips are clearly part of the video. In addition, even if we were to consider the rest of the video separately, there was use of Astaire's persona within it, since his name and stills from his movies were prominently displayed.

[6] Mrs. Astaire raises the spectre of a "draconian" destruction of "legitimate publicity rights" under our interpretation of § 990, suggesting that a celebrity's name and photograph could now be used freely to advertise any film, however unconnected to the celebrity. That is not so. Our holding in this case is narrow and driven by the unusual facts that Astaire had licensed the use of his name to the dance studios and that the film clips of Astaire dancing, clips

which were in the public domain, were used in a how-to-dance video. The absurdity Mrs. Astaire claims will arise from our interpretation would in reality arise from hers. She is asking courts to make a content-based decision every time a filmmaker or author uses the name or image of a celebrity; "Is this use of his name related to the content of this book, or is it merely advertising used to call attention to the book?" Not only would this create great uncertainty in the law, but there is no suggestion within § 990 or its legislative history that the California state legislature intended such an inquiry.

In sum, we conclude that when subsection (n) is read in its entirety, the only interpretation of its plain language which is internally consistent and gives effect to each phrase and clause of the provisions leads to the conclusion that Best's use of the Astaire film clips is exempt. Rather than end the inquiry here, however, under California law we must determine whether the meaning of the plain language comports with the legislature's purpose.

Mrs. Astaire asserts that the legislative history of Senate Bill 613 ("SB 613"), the legislation which enacted § 990 in 1984, supports the district court's conclusion that subsection (n)(1) creates a limited exception for "legitimate historical, fictional, and biographical accounts of deceased celebrities." Mrs. Astaire asserts that because the Astaire film clips were included in Best's videotapes to make them more attractive and salable, the exemption of subsection (n)(1) does not apply.

To support her argument that the Legislature intended subsection (n)(1)'s exemption to be limited to legitimate historical, biographical, and fictional works, Mrs. Astaire principally relies on several letters written by the author of SB 613. No matter how illuminating we might find these letters, California law generally prevents us from "consider[ing] the motives or understandings of an individual

legislator even if he or she authored the statute." *Williams v. Garcetti,* 853 P.2d 507, 510 (Cal. 1993) (quoting *Delaney v. Superior Court,* 789 P.2d 734, 743 n.12 (Cal. 1990)). As a result, we may not consider the various letters written by the author of SB 613.

We may consider, however, "the history of the statute, committee reports, and staff bill reports . . . to determine the intent of the Legislature." *DeCastro West Chodorow & Burns, Inc. v. Superior Court,* 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 792, 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). We may also consider the evolution of a proposed statute after its original introduction in the California State Senate or Assembly, as such evolution may "offer considerable enlightenment as to legislative intent." *People v. Goodloe,* 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 15, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).

As originally introduced, SB 613 did not contain § 990 at all, instead focusing on modifications to existing statutory provisions to create a right of publicity for the heirs and descendents of deceased personalities. After the bill was passed by the Senate, however, it was amended in the Assembly several times. On June 12, 1984, § 990(n) appeared for the first time in the amended legislation. It read:

> Nothing in this section shall be construed to derogate from any rights protected by constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech or freedom of the press, such as the night to use a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in a play, book, magazine, newspaper, film, television program, or similar medium of expression, to the extent the use is protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech or freedom of the press.

S.B. 613, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1984) (hereinafter "S.B. 613") (as amended June 12, 1984).

A staff report on this version of SB 613 criticized this language for being superfluous: "[i]rrespective of this stated intent, a defendant who has used a person's name, voice, etc. without authorization may assert a First Amendment privilege." Staff of Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., *Report on S.B. 613 (Campbell) As Amended 6/12/84* at 6 (Cal. 1984). Shortly thereafter, § 990(n) was amended to its current version, which does not contain the language explicitly limiting the scope of its exemption to constitutionally protected uses. *See* S.B. 613 (as amended July 3, 1984).

[7] The Legislature's removal of the language "to the extent the use is protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech or freedom of the press" from SB 613 is a telling clue as to the Legislature's intent. By deleting this language, the Legislature demonstrated an intent to adopt a broader exemption that was not limited to constitutionally protected uses. In other words, the evolution of subsection (n) demonstrates that the interpretation of the statute we conclude is required by the plain language is consistent with the Legislature's intent.

The same staff report on SB 613 describes the bill generally as follows:

> [T]he bill is intended to address circumstances in which (a) commercial gain is had through the exploitation of the name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness of a celebrity or public figure in the marketing of goods or services or (b) a celebrity or public figure is subjected to abuse or ridicule in the form of a marketed product. Such goods or services typically involved the use of a *deceased* celebrity's name or likeness, e.g., on posters, T-shirts, porcelain plate's, and other collectibles; in toys, gadgets, and other merchandise; in look-alike services.

Staff of Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, *supra,* at 3-4. Several other legislative staff reports describe the legislation

similarly. *See, e.g.,* Assembly Office of Research, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., *Report on S.B. 613 (Campbell) As Amended 8/9/84* at 3 (Cal. 1984).

To the extent these reports reflect the Legislature's intent when it enacted § 990, our conclusion that Best's use of the Astaire film clips is exempt from liability is not inconsistent with this expressed intent. Best's use in no possible way subjects Fred Astaire to abuse or ridicule. Best's use is also nothing like the exploitative marketing uses described in these legislative staff reports.

[8] We recognize, however, that Best placed these film clips in its videotapes for a reason: to make the videotapes more salable. Nevertheless, neither the statute nor the legislative history provides any support for treating Best's use of the Astaire film clips any differently from the use of the same clips in a documentary about dance in film, a use that Mrs. Astaire concedes would be exempt from liability. In short, whether the use is included to increase the marketability of a product cannot be the test of whether it is exempt from § 990 liability.

[9] Having considered what limited guidance the legislative history of SB 613 gives us regarding the meaning of subsection (n), we conclude that the legislative history does not support Mrs. Astaire's contentions that the exception for use in a "play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program" is limited to "legitimate historical, fictional, and biographical accounts of deceased celebrities." We conclude that the language of subsection (n) should be given its ordinary and usual meaning, and that Best's use of the Astaire film clips is accordingly exempt.[3]

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[3]Construing subsection (n) to exempt Best's use of the Astaire film clips also has the commendable effect of avoiding the potential First Amendment concern which would be created were Best held liable for

CONCLUSION

We conclude that Best's use of the late Fred Astaire's likeness/photograph in its "How to Dance" videotapes is exempt from § 990 liability pursuant to subsection (n).[4] Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is reversed and we remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Best.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:

I dissent from the majority's conclusion that this use of Fred Astaire's legendary film performances, to preface a videotape having nothing to do with Fred Astaire, is exempt under the California statute. I dissent with respect, however, because the statute is not as clear as judges would like.

First I assume, without needing to decide, that the majority is correct in holding that subsection (n)(1) of Cal. Civ. Code § 990 exempts uses in videotapes, as well as in films, plays and other forms of expression, even though the statute does not expressly refer to videotapes. In my view, the majority goes wrong when it holds that this use of the Astaire footage is exempt as an "advertisement or commercial announcement" of an exempt use.

The majority reasons that the language of subsection (n)(4) exempts all advertisements or commercial an-

---

using the film clips in an original videotape. Under California's principles of statutory construction, a construction which best avoids conflict with constitutional limitations is favored. *See J.A. Savage v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.*, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).

[4]Having concluded that Best's use of the Astaire film clips is exempt from liability under § 990, we need not reach the other issues presented by the parties' arguments, *viz.*, whether Best's use is covered by § 990(a), whether Mrs. Astaire's § 990 claim is preempted by the federal Copyright Act, and whether holding Best liable violates the First Amendment.

nouncements for plays, films, videotapes, etc. This is incorrect. That subsection exempts only advertisements or commercial announcements for uses permitted in the earlier paragraphs. The relevant exemption in this case must be the exemption in paragraph (1) for use of an image or likeness in a videotape, film, play or other expressive form. This footage of Astaire, however, is not used in the dance instruction video. The clips are used to promote the accompanying videotape of dance instruction that does not use Astaire's image. Had the clips been used in an announcement physically separated from the rest of the video, the use of the clips would clearly not have been exempt. The fact that Best chose to attach the clips to the dance instruction video in the form of a prefatory announcement does not change its essential nature: a commercial announcement of something unrelated to any exempted use of a photograph or likeness. The clips are therefore not advertising or announcing a "use permitted by paragraph (1)," and thus they are not exempt under paragraph (4).

Under the majority's reasoning one could with impunity hawk a videotape on fashion for the next century by introducing it with footage of Jacqueline Kennedy. The statute was intended to prevent such exploitation, not immunize it. I therefore must respectfully dissent.

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APPENDIX C

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBYN ASTAIRE,

Plaintiff-Appellee.

vs.

BEST FILM & VIDEO CORP.

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-56632
D.C. No. CV-90-00261-KN-A

ROBYN ASTAIRE,

Plaintiff-Appellee.

vs.

BEST FILM & VIDEO CORP.

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-56633
D.C. No. CV-90-00261-KN-A

ORDER

Before: SCHROEDER, WIGGINS, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-appellee's motion to stay issuance of the mandate and to certify question to the California Supreme Court and motion to file petition for rehearing are denied.

Defendant-appellant's motion for leave to file late responses to Astaire's motion for leave to file petition for rehearing and motion to stay issuance of the mandate is denied.

So ordered.

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D

CIVIL CODE SECTION 990

990. (a) Any person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services without prior consent from the person or persons specified in subdivision (c), shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof. In addition, in any action brought under this section, the person who violated the section shall be liable to the injured party or parties in an amount equal to the greater of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) or the actual damages suffered by the injured party or parties, as a result of the unauthorized use, and any profits from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the use and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages. In establishing these profits, the injured party or parties shall be required to present proof only of the gross revenue attributable to the use and the person who violated the section is required to prove his or her deductible expenses. Punitive damages may also be awarded to the injured party or parties.

The prevailing party or parties in any action under this section shall also be entitled to attorneys' fees and costs.

(b) The rights recognized under this section are property rights, freely transferable, in whole or in part, by contract or by means of trust or testamentary documents, whether the transfer occurs before the death of the deceased personality, by the deceased personality or his or her transferees, or, after the death of the deceased personality, by the person or persons in whom the rights vest under this section or the transferees of that person or persons.

(c) The consent required by this section shall be exercisable by the person or persons to whom the right of consent (or portion thereof) has been transferred in accordance with subdivision (b), or if no such transfer has occurred, then by the person or persons to whom the right of consent (or portion thereof) has passed in accordance with subdivision (d).

(d) Subject to subdivisions (b) and (c), after the death of any person, the rights under this section shall belong to the following person or persons and may be exercised, on behalf of and for the benefit of all of those persons, by those persons who, in the aggregate, are entitled to more than a one-half interest in the rights:

(1) The entire interest in those rights belong to the surviving spouse of the deceased personality unless there are any surviving children or grandchildren of the deceased personality, in which case one-half of the entire interest in those rights belong to the surviving spouse.

(2) The entire interest in those rights belong to the surviving children of the deceased personality and to the surviving children of any dead child of the deceased personality unless the deceased personality has a surviving spouse, in which case the ownership of a one-half interest in rights is divided among the surviving children and grandchildren.

(3) If there is no surviving spouse, and no surviving children or grandchildren, then the entire interest in those rights belong to the surviving parent or parents of the deceased personality.

(4) The rights of the deceased personality's children and grandchildren are in all cases divided among them and exercisable in the manner provided in Section 240 of the Probate Code according to the number of the deceased personality's children represented; the share of the

children of a dead child of a deceased personality can be exercised only by the action of a majority of them.

(e) If any deceased personality does not transfer his or her rights under this section by contract, or by means of a trust or testamentary document, and there are no surviving persons as described in subdivision (d), then the rights set forth in subdivision (a) shall terminate.

(f)(1) A successor-in-interest to the rights of a deceased personality under this section or a licensee thereof may not recover damages for a use prohibited by this section that occurs before the successor-in-interest or licensee registers a claim of the rights under paragraph 2.

(2) Any person claiming to be a successor-in-interest to the rights of a deceased personality under this section or a licensee thereof may register that claim with the Secretary of State on a form prescribed by the Secretary of State and upon payment of a fee of ten dollars ($10). The form shall be verified and shall include the name and date of death of the deceased personality, the name and address of the claimant, the basis of the claim, and the rights claimed.

(3) Upon receipt and after filing of any document under this section, the Secretary of State may microfilm or reproduce by other techniques any of the filings or documents and destroy the original filing or document. The microfilm or other reproduction of any document under the provision of this section shall be admissible in any court of law. The microfilm or other reproduction of any document may be destroyed by the Secretary of State 50 years after the death of the personality named therein.

(4) Claims registered under this subdivision shall be public records.

(g) No action shall be brought under this section by reason of any use of a deceased personality's name, voice,

signature, photograph, or likeness occurring after the expiration of 50 years from the death of the deceased personality.

(h) As used in this section, "deceased personality" means any natural person whose name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial value at the time of his or her death, whether or not during the lifetime of that natural person the person used his or her name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness on or in products, merchandise or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or solicitation of purchase of, products, merchandise, goods or service.

A "deceased personality" shall include, without limitation, any such natural person who has died within 50 years prior to January 1, 1985.

(i) As used in this section, "photograph" means any photograph or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any video tape or live television transmission, of any person, such that the deceased personality is readily identifiable. A deceased personality shall be deemed to be readily identifiable from a photograph when one who views the photograph with the naked eye can reasonably determine who the person depicted in the photograph is.

(j) For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a).

(k) The use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in a commercial medium shall not constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a) solely because the material containing the use is commercially sponsored or contains paid advertising. Rather it shall be a question of fact whether or not the use of the deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness

was so directly connected with the commercial sponsorship or with the paid advertising as to constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a).

(l) Nothing in this section shall apply to the owners or employees of any medium used for advertising, including, but not limited to, newspapers, magazines, radio and television networks and stations, cable television systems, billboards, and transit ads, by whom any advertisement or solicitation in violation of this section is published or disseminated, unless it is established that the owners or employees had knowledge of the unauthorized use of the deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness as prohibited by this section.

(m) The remedies provided for in this section are cumulative and shall be in addition to any others provided for by law.

(n) This section shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any of the following instances:

(1) A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement not exempt under paragraph (4).

(2) Material that is of political or newsworthy value.

(3) Single and original works of fine art.

(4) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted by paragraph (1), (2), or (3).

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX E

Amendments to the California Rules of Court
and Standards of Judicial Administration

Adopted by the Judicial Council
Effective January 1, 1998, and July 1, 1998

California Rules of Court

Rule 29.5. Questions of state law certified by federal appellate courts and other courts

(a) [Requirements for certified questions] The California Supreme Court may answer questions of law certified to it by the Supreme Court of the United States, a United States Court of Appeals, or the court of last resort of any state, territory, or commonwealth, provided that:

(1) the certifying court requests the answer;

(2) the questions may be determinative of a cause pending in the certifying court; and

(3) the decisions of the California appellate courts provide no controlling precedent concerning the certified question.

(b) [Contents of certification request] Only a court specified in subdivision (a) may certify a question. The request shall be by an order that sets forth:

(1) the caption of the case, including names and addresses of counsel and of parties appearing per se, and a designation of the party to be deemed the petitioner on the certified question if the request to answer is granted;

(2) the questions of law to be answered;

(3) a statement (by stipulation of the parties subject to approval by the certifying court, or by the court itself) of all facts relevant to the certified question, and showing

fully the nature of the controversy and the circumstances in which the question arose;

(4) statements (i) demonstrating that the question certified is contested and that there is no controlling precedent in the case law of the California appellate courts; (ii) explaining how an authoritative answer to the certified question may be determinative of a cause pending in the certifying court; and (iii) indicating that the answer provided by the California Supreme Court will be followed by the certifying court; and

(5) such additional information as the certifying court may deem relevant and useful.

(c) [Briefs and other materials] The certifying court shall furnish legible copies of all relevant briefs to the California Supreme Court with the request for an answer to the certified question. The California Supreme Court may request that the certifying court furnish additional material, such as exhibits or all or a portion of the record that, in the opinion of the court, may be useful in answering the certified question.

(d) [Request procedure] The judge or justice presiding at the certification hearing (if any) or the presiding judge or justice of the court or panel certifying the question shall sign the request for an answer to the certified question, and the clerk of the certifying court shall forward it under its official seal to the California Supreme Court.

(e) [Factors that may be considered] The California Supreme Court shall have discretion to accept or deny the request for an answer to the certified question of law. In exercising its discretion the court may consider:

(1) factors that it ordinarily considers in deciding whether to grant review of a decision of a California Court of Appeal or to issue an alternative writ or other order in an original matter;

(2) comity, and whether answering the question will facilitate the certifying court's functioning or help terminate existing litigation;

(3) the extent to which an answer would turn on questions of fact; and

(4) any other factors the court may deem appropriate.

(f) [Clarification of question] At any time, the California Supreme Court may restate the certified question or may ask the certifying court to restate or clarify the certified question.

(g) [Order denying or accepting request] The California Supreme Court shall issue an order accepting or denying the request for an answer to the certified question. If the court accepts the request, it shall announce that determination in the manner that it announces the acceptance of cases for review, and thereafter.

(1) the California Rules of Court for briefing, argument, and conduct of appeals shall govern further proceedings on any certified question unless the court or the Judicial Council otherwise provides;

(2) fees and costs shall be the same as in appeals docketed before the California Supreme Court and, in civil matters, shall be equally divided between or among the parties unless the certifying court in its request for an answer to the certified question provides for a different allocation, or the California Supreme Court provides otherwise; and

(3) the California Supreme Court may in its discretion assign a certified question such priority on its docket as considerations of fairness, exigency, and comity may require.

(h) [Notice to California Attorney General] If the certified question concerns the proper interpretation of a California statute, in litigation in which the State of California or an officer, agency, or employee of the state is not a party, the clerk of the California Supreme Court shall notify the California Attorney General and the California Supreme Court may permit him or her to file briefs on the issue.

(i) [Transmission of opinion] The clerk shall forward the California Supreme Court's written opinion stating the law governing the certified question to the certifying court, under the seal of the Supreme Court, and also shall forward copies of the opinion to counsel of record.

(j) [Publication and precedential effect] The California Supreme Court's answer to a certified question shall have the same authoritative and precedential force as any other decision of the court, and shall be published in the Official Reports.

(k) [Procedural rules] The California Supreme Court or the Judicial Council may adopt procedures governing practice under this rule.

Rule 29.5 adopted effective January 1, 1998.

98 - 15

FILED
JUL 30 1998
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

No. A-851

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM 1997

ROBYN ASTAIRE,
Petitioner,
vs.
BEST FILM & VIDEO CORPORATION,
Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

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COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the appellate court's exercise of its broad discretion under California Rules of Court, Rule 29.5, resulting in its decision not to certify a question of law to the California Supreme Court, where the request to certify was made for the first time after the Court of Appeal had already decided the issue, was an abuse of discretion?

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No. A-851

In the Supreme Court

OF THE

United States

OCTOBER TERM 1997

ROBYN ASTAIRE,
Petitioner,
VS.
BEST FILM & VIDEO CORPORATION,
Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Ninth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondent BEST FILM & VIDEO CORPORATION submits this brief in opposition to ROBYN ASTAIRE'S Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner seeks review of the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, specifically the Court's order denying certification of the issue of state law to the California Supreme Court and the order denying her petition for rehearing.

The case arose out of BEST FILM'S authorized use of Fred Astaire's name and image in a series of dance instruc-

tional videos. Robyn Astaire[1] filed an action against BEST FILM and the Ronby Corporation alleging that their use of her late husband's image in the videotapes violated her statutory right to control such use under Civil Code § 990. (Pet. App. A-6.)[2]

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for ASTAIRE, determining that BEST FILM'S use of ASTAIRE'S name and image in the videotapes violated her rights under § 990. (Pet. App. A-2.) The district court further concluded that BEST FILM'S use did not constitute a use for "advertising, selling or soliciting" as defined in § 990 and therefore not exempt under § 990(n).[3] Finally, the district court held that ASTAIRE'S claim was not preempted by federal copyright law and that the First Amendment did not protect BEST FILM'S use. (Pet. App. A-2, A-3.)

---

[1]Robyn Astaire is the widow of performer Fred Astaire and upon Fred's death succeeded Fred's rights in his name, voice, likeness and persona under California Civil Code § 990. (Pet. App. A-2.)

[2]Citations to "Pet. App." refer to Petitioner's Appendix attached to Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed on June 25, 1998.

[3]Section 990(n) provides:

"(n) This section shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any of the following instances:

(1) A play, book, magazine, newspaper, musical, composition, film, radio or television program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement not exempt under paragraph (4).

(2) Material that is of political or newsworthy value.

(3) Single and original works of fine art.

(4) An advertisement or commercial announcement for a use permitted by paragraph (1), (2), or (3)."

(Cal. Civ. Code § 990(n).) (Pet. App. D.)

On March 30, 1994, the district court certified the orders regarding summary judgment for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) concluding that the issues are dispositive of this case and raise questions of significant public interest. (Resp. App. A-8.)[4] BEST FILM petitioned for permission to appeal following certification by the district court. ASTAIRE opposed certification on the grounds that BEST FILM, failed to demonstrate that an immediate appeal would "materially advance the ultimate termination" of this litigation, as required by Section 1292(b); and based on the court's broad discretion to deny certification, where, as here, the case did not present the "necessary" exceptional circumstances. (Resp. App. B-8.) The Ninth Circuit denied BEST FILM'S permission to appeal. (Resp. App. C-1.) A stipulated judgment was then entered which allowed this appeal.

More than three years following judgment in favor of ASTAIRE, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of BEST FILM. (Pet. App. A-17.) The Court held that BEST FILM'S use of ASTAIRE'S name and image in the instructional videotapes was exempt from liability under § 990(n). (Pet. App. A-17.)

ASTAIRE petitioned the court for rehearing *en banc.* (Pet. App. B-1.) The petition was denied and the written opinion was amended, (Pet. App. B.) ASTAIRE then filed a motion to stay issuance of the mandate *and to certify the question of state law to the California Supreme Court* pursuant to Rule 29.5 and a second petition for rehearing on the same grounds. The Court similarly denied ASTAIRE'S motion for stay and certification and her second petition for rehearing. (Pet. App. C-1.)

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[4]Citations to "Resp. App." refer to Respondent BEST FILM'S Appendix attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein.

ASTAIRE now challenges the Ninth Circuit's decision, including the Court's orders denying rehearing and certification.

A. Factual Background

This action arose out of the alleged unauthorized use of Fred Astaire's name and image in instructional videos produced by BEST FILM. (Pet. App. A-6.) Mr. Astaire granted the Ronby Corporation an exclusive license to use his name and likeness in connection with the operation of dance studios, schools and related activities. (Pet. App. A-6.) Ronby entered into an agreement with BEST FILM to produce dance instructional videos using Mr. Astaire's name and likeness. (Pet. App. A-6.) BEST FILM has been manufacturing and distributing videotapes known as "Fred Astaire Dance Series." (Pet. App. A-6.) The videotape includes narration, instruction and about 90 seconds of footage from two of Mr. Astaire's films, *Second Chorus* and *Royal Wedding* ("the ASTAIRE film clips"). Mr. Astaire died in 1987 and was survived by his wife, Robyn Astaire, who succeeded to all rights in his name and likeness, pursuant to Civil Code § 990. Mrs. Astaire is the petitioner in this action.

B. Procedural History

On January 19, 1990, ASTAIRE filed this action in federal court against BEST FILM and the Ronby Corporation, alleging violation of her § 990 rights by using Mr. Astaire's image in "the ASTAIRE film clips" in the videotapes without her permission and related claims.[5] (Pet.

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[5]This action was originally filed in the Los Angeles Superior Court on December 14, 1989. It was removed to the Central District on January 19, 1990. The other claims, included trademark, trade name and service mark infringement; unfair competition; and violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). ASTAIRE asserted an additional

App. A-7.) Following summary adjudication of the related claims in favor of BEST FILM and Ronby and settlement of contract claims between BEST FILM and Ronby, BEST FILM and ASTAIRE filed cross-motions for summary judgment on January 10, 1994. (Resp. App. A-16.)

On March 11, 1994 the district court granted summary judgment for ASTAIRE, determining that BEST FILM'S use of ASTAIRE'S name and image in the videotapes violated her rights under § 990. (Pet. App. A-2.) The district court further concluded that BEST FILM'S use did not constitute a use for "advertising, selling or soliciting" as defined in § 990 and therefore was not exempt under § 990(n). Finally, the district court held that ASTAIRE'S claim was not preempted by federal copyright law and that the First Amendment did not protect BEST FILM'S use. (Pet. App. A-2, A-3.)

On March 30, 1994, District Court Judge, David V. Kenyon certified his summary judgment orders of November 26, 1990, July 17, 1991 and March 11, 1994 for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and stayed all proceedings in the district court. (Resp. App. A-8.) Judge Kenyon concluded the issues were dispositive of the case and raised questions of significant public interest. (Resp. App. A-8.) BEST FILM petitioned for permission to appeal following certification by the district court of the sole controlling question of law in this matter, that is, whether the mere use of a deceased celebrity's likeness in instructional videotapes violated Civil Code § 990 where it has been judicially determined that there is no use of the celebrity's likeness for advertising or selling the

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breach of contract claim against the Ronby Corporation only. ASTAIRE and Ronby entered into a settlement agreement in July of 1993 and therefore Ronby is no longer a party to this litigation, (Resp. App. B-11.)

videotapes and where the use is reasonably related to the education message found in the videotapes. (Resp. App. A-17)

Contrary to the position ASTAIRE now asserts, ASTAIRE opposed certification of the state law issue on the grounds that BEST FILM, failed to demonstrate that an immediate appeal would "materially advance the ultimate termination" of this litigation, as required by Section 1292(b). (Resp. App. B-7.) ASTAIRE argued:

> "To the contrary, Best's Petition would, if granted serve to ensure that the district court proceedings in this case (which have already lasted more than five years) would be delayed for at least an additional 12-18 months pending briefing, argument, and decision in this court. This is so because regardless of this court's disposition of the issues raised by Best, further proceedings would be required in the district court, and further appeals to this court would almost certainly ensue." (Resp. App. B-7, B-8.)

ASTAIRE further opposed BEST FILM'S petition to certify the state law issue on the ground that BEST FILM did not demonstrate the existence of substantial ground for difference of opinion. (Resp. App. B-8.) ASTAIRE asserted that the district court's ruling was in "accord with settled law and with the language, purpose, and legislative history of California Civil Code Section 990." (Resp. App. B-8.)

ASTAIRE lastly opposed certification of the state law question on the basis of the court's broad discretion to deny certification. ASTAIRE stated,

> "the Petition should be denied as a matter of this court's discretion because this case manifestly does not present the sort of exceptional circumstances that are generally required before this court will accept such

> interlocutory review under § 1292(b)." (Resp. App. B-8.)

On May 31, 1994, the Ninth Circuit denied BEST FILM'S petition for permission to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). (Resp. App. C-1.)

C. The Court Of Appeals' Decisions

On June 20, 1997 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the district court holding that:

> "under California law, a videotape manufacturer may use clips from a deceased entertainer's movies for internal advertising of instructional videotapes under a state statutory exemption for such use in " 'film'." (Pet. App. A-2.)

Reviewing the issue of statutory interpretation *de novo* from a grant of summary judgment, the panel majority determined that Section 990(n) immunized BEST FILM'S use of the public domain film clips on two grounds. Agreeing with BEST FILM, the Panel first, found that the provisions of Section 990(n)(1), which grant a broad exemption for any uses of a celebrities' image in "film" and other protected mediums of expression, applied with equal force to videotapes such as the "Fred Astaire Dance Series". (Pet. App. A-11, A-12.) Alternatively, the Court ruled *arguendo* that Section 990(n)(4) — a subpart explicitly referenced in Section 990(n)(1) — also exempted the use of the film clips as embodied in the videotapes even if the film clips could be considered "an advertisement or commercial announcement." (Pet. App. A-12, A-13.) Having ruled in favor of BEST FILM on the basis of substantive law, the Court held it was unnecessary to reach the remaining issues of federal law."[6] (Pet. App. A-17.)

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[6] "Having concluded that Best's use of the Astaire film clips is exempt from liability under § 990, we need not reach the other issues presented

On July 7, 1997, ASTAIRE filed her first of two petitions for rehearing *en banc,* alleging the Ninth Circuit improperly decided the case on a ground neither raised below nor briefed in this court; that the Court's interpretation of § 990(n)(4) will lead to unjust results; and that the Court based its holding on a misreading of the legislative history of § 990. The Court denied ASTAIRE'S petition and filed its order along with an amended opinion on February 19, 1998. (Pet. App. B.)

On February 26, 1998, ASTAIRE filed her second petition for rehearing, on the ground that the Ninth Circuit should exercise its discretion to certify the state law question to the California Supreme Court pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 29.5. BEST FILM opposed the petition for rehearing on several grounds, including: that ASTAIRE had waived her right to seek state court adjudication by filing her claim in federal court; that certification is inappropriate after the appeal, as here, has been finally determined; and that the requested question for certification would not be determinative of the appeal. By order of the Court on April 13, 1998, ASTAIRE'S petition for rehearing was denied. (Pet. App. C-1.)

On March 2, 1998, ASTAIRE filed a motion to stay issuance of the mandate and to certify to the California Supreme Court the controlling issue of state law at issue.[7] By order of the Court on April 13, 1998, ASTAIRE'S motion to stay issuance of the mandate and to certify

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by the parties' arguments, *viz.,* whether Best's use is covered by § 990(a), whether Mrs. Astaire's § 990 claim is preempted by the federal Copyright Act, and whether holding Best liable violates the First Amendment." (Pet, App. A-17 fn3.)

[7]ASTAIRE'S motion was based on the same arguments proffered in her second petition for rehearing cited above. BEST FILM'S opposition was likewise based on the same grounds stated in its opposition to ASTAIRE'S second petition for rehearing.

question to the California Supreme Court were denied. (Pet. App. C-1.)

D. Reasons Why The Petition Should Be Denied

This case does not merit review. The decisions of the Ninth Circuit present none of the established grounds for exercise of certiorari jurisdiction and, in any event, are correct in the aspects challenged by petitioner.

The Court of Appeals has broad discretion to deny certification of the state law question to the California Supreme Court and, where as here, its decision is supported by procedural and substantive facts in the record, the decision should not be disturbed.

A separate and independent ground to deny ASTAIRE'S petition is that she has been less than forthright with this Court. Specifically, ASTAIRE failed to advise this Court that it sought certification of the state law question after the appeal had been finally determined and therefore certification was inappropriate under California Rules of Court, Rule 29.5 which limits questions for certification to those "determinative of a cause pending in the certifying court." (Cal. Rule of Court 29.5(a)(2).) (Pet. App. E-1.) ASTAIRE also failed to disclose to this Court that her extension of time to file her petition was procured for the purpose of raising First Amendment issues, which ASTAIRE did not present anywhere in the Petition, nor are they possibly argued in a manner to assist petitioner.

Certification will only cause a further significant delay in this case. The California Supreme Court ordinarily requires two years to resolve cases presented to it for decision. That would add to the typical three year life span of an appeal in the Ninth Circuit.

This case does not present any novel or important questions of federal law. The First Amendment issue, as raised

by BEST FILM and *not* by petitioner, was the only potential constitutional issue in this case. Such issue, however, was never reached by the Ninth Circuit. All other issues in this case are matters of California state law not deserving address by the California Supreme Court since it can be competently resolved by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

On these grounds, ASTAIRE'S Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION TO DENY CERTIFICATION OF THE STATE LAW ISSUE TO THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT WAS WITHIN THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE REVIEWING COURT AND ITS DECISION SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED SINCE IT IS SUPPORTED BY PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE FACTS IN THE RECORD.

The Supreme Court has firmly established that decisions whether to certify a question of law to a state court, "rests in the sound discretion of the federal courts." (*Lehman Brothers v. Schein et al.* (1974) 416 U.S. 386, 391, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 1744, *Complaint of McClinn* 744 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1984) (remanded on other grounds).) In *Lehman Brothers*, the Court vacated and remanded the decision of the Court of Appeals so it could consider the issue of certification. In so doing, the Court cautioned not to disturb decisions merely because the means for certification were available but not used, in light of the additional time and money required to certify an issue of state law. In his concurring opinion, Justice Rhenquist stated:

> "If a district court or court of appeals believes that it can resolve an issue of state law with available research

> materials already at hand, and makes the effort to do so, its determination should not be disturbed simply because the certification procedure existed but was not used." (*Lehman Brothers, supra* 416 U.S. 386 at p. 395, 94 S.Ct. 1741 at p. 1746) (concurring opinion).)

In *Complaint of McClinn*, the Ninth Circuit denied certification of a state law question with respect to application of an Alaskan statute based on its finding that the legal issue involved would not be determinative of the case pending before it. (*Complaint of McClinn, supra* 744 F.2d at pp. 681 – 682 (9th Cir. 1984).) The Court underscored the delays arising from certification, since the issue to be certified was only one of many involved in the case. (*Id.* at 681.)

A. Certification Will Only Cause Further Undue Delay In This Case.

In deciding whether to certify a question of state law, the Fifth Circuit takes into consideration whether the question is close and whether it is "important to the state in terms of comity." (*Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp.* 526 F.2d 266, 275 (5th Cir. 1976) *cert. denied,* 429 U.S. 829, 97 S.Ct. 88.) The Court also deliberates upon the potential delays involved and "whether the legal issue can be framed to produce a helpful response by the state." (*Id.*)

This Court has also addressed concerns of undue delay and has determined that notwithstanding the benefits of certification over abstention, certification "entails more delay and expense than would an ordinary decision on the state question on the merits by the federal court." (*Lehman Brothers, supra* 416 U.S. at p. 395, 94 S.Ct. at p. 1744; see *Clay v. Sun Insurance Office. Ltd.* (1964) 363 U.S. 207, 226–227, 80 S.Ct. 1222.)

Certification will only cause a further significant delay in this case. The California Supreme Court ordinarily requires two years to resolve cases presented to it for decision. That would add to the typical three year life span of an appeal in the Ninth Circuit. In light of the Ninth Circuit's ability to resolve the issue of state law with respect to Civil Code § 990, there is no need for the delays associated with certification.

B. Once The Court Of Appeals Issues Its Opinion, It Is Inappropriate To Certify Questions Of State Law To The State Supreme Court.

Under California Rules of Court, Rule 29.5, questions of state law may only be certified by the Ninth Circuit when "the questions may be determinative of a cause *pending* in the certifying court." (Cal, Rules of Court, Rule 29.5(a)(2) (emphasis added). On February 25, 1997, the Ninth Circuit issued an order denying ASTAIRE'S initial petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing *en banc*. This order concluded the appeal before the Ninth Circuit. According to the conditions of Rule 29.5, therefore, the California Supreme Court may not consider the question requested to be certified with respect to Civil Code section 990.

C. There Remained Other Issues In The Litigation Which Would Have Precluded Any Benefit Of A State Court Ruling On The State Law Issue.

Even if the Ninth Circuit had revived the appeal for purposes of certification, and the state court had ruled in ASTAIRE'S favor, the state court ruling would not have been determinative of the appeal. As the Ninth Circuit noted, its opinion obviated the need to consider "whether Best's use is covered by § 990(a), whether Mrs. Astaire's § 990 claim is preempted by the federal Copyright Act, and whether holding Best liable violates the First Amendment." (Pet. App. A-17, n3.) If the requested certification had

resulted in a state court determination in ASTAIRE'S favor, the Ninth Circuit would still have had to consider the remaining issues. The Ninth Circuit's decision to deny certification here was not a novel idea as demonstrated by its ruling under similar circumstances in *Complaint of McLinn,* where the Court denied state court certification because the appeal involved several other issues and certification would not necessarily be determinative of the outcome of the appeal. (*Complaint of McLinn, supra* 744 F.2d at pp. 681-682 (9th Cir. 1984).)

D. The Question Of Law Raised Under Civil Code Section 990 Does Not Rise To The Level Required For Review By The California Supreme Court.

Not every unresolved issue of law is deemed by the California Supreme Court to be a genuinely important issue of law. Although the Civil Code § 990 issue has not yet been interpreted by California courts, the certification process will probably only be utilized by the California Supreme Court to resolve what it considers to be truly important issues of California law. The questions presented here do not rise to that level.

II.

PETITIONER'S LACK OF CANDOR WITH THIS COURT REGARDING HER GROUNDS FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME AND HER "SELECTIVE" FAILURE TO ADVISE THIS COURT OF SIGNIFICANT TIMING ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION IS AN INDEPENDENT BASIS TO DENY THIS PETITION.

A. In Applying To This Court For An Extension Of Time To File Her Petition, ASTAIRE Relied On

Grounds Never Mentioned In Her Petition And Which Could Not Have Assisted Her Position.

In her first application for an extension of time to file this Petition, ASTAIRE stated that she was "presently considering whether to file a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the panel's apparent conclusion that imposition of liability on BEST FILM would create First Amendment concerns." The Ninth Circuit, however, *never reached* the First Amendment issue. Further, it was BEST FILM, *not ASTAIRE,* who argued that the First Amendment issue was applicable to this case. The Court of Appeals having ruled in favor of BEST FILM on the basis of substantive state law, there is no First Amendment issue to be considered by this Honorable Court.

In footnote 4 of page 1525 of the Ninth Circuit opinion, the Court stated:

> "Having concluded that Best's use of the Astaire film clips is exempt from liability under § 990, we need not reach the other issues presented by the parties' arguments, viz., whether Best's use is covered by § 990(a), whether Mrs. Astaire's § 990 claim is preempted by the federal Copyright Act, and whether holding Best liable violates the First Amendment." (Opinion, p. 1525, fn. 4.) (Pet. App. A-17.)

ASTAIRE also relies on footnote 3 of page 1524 as possible grounds for a Petition to this Court for Writ of Certiorari. Such footnote mentions only that a "potential First Amendment concern" might have arisen had BEST FILM been found liable for the use of film clips in a videotape. The use of film clips by BEST FILM, however, was held to be exempt under California Civil Code section 990(n), and the Ninth Circuit did not reach any First Amendment issues.

III.

AS PREVIOUSLY ARGUED BY ASTAIRE THE ISSUES RAISED UNDER CIVIL CODE SECTION 990 ARE DISPOSITIVE OF THIS CASE.

Petitioner's argument that the Civil Code section 990 issues are not dispositive runs directly counter to the arguments made by ASTAIRE in her Opposition to BEST FILM'S Petition for Permission to Appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). (Resp. App. B.) There, on behalf of ASTAIRE, Mr. Hungar argued vigorously that these issues would, in fact, be dispositive and that granting BEST FILM'S petition would only result in further unduly delay. (Resp. App. B-7, B-8.) ASTAIRE argued:

> "... Best's Petition would, if granted serve to ensure that the district court proceedings in this case (which have already lasted more than five years) would be delayed for at least an additional 12–18 months pending briefing, argument, and decision in this court. This is so because regardless of this court's disposition of the issues raised by Best, further proceedings would be required in the district court, and further appeals to this court would almost certainly ensue." (Resp. App. B-8.)

ASTAIRE further opposed BEST FILM'S petition to certify the state law issue on the grounds that BEST FILM did not demonstrate the existence of substantial ground for difference of opinion. (Resp. App. B-8.) ASTAIRE asserted that the district court's ruling was in "accord with settled law and with the language, purpose, and legislative history of California Civil Code Section 990." (Resp. App. B-8.)

In further contradiction of ASTAIRE'S current position in its Petition for Writ, she opposed certification of the state law question on the basis of the court's broad discretion to deny certification. ASTAIRE stated,

> "the Petition should be denied as a matter of this court's discretion because this case manifestly does not present the sort of exceptional circumstances that are generally required before this court will accept such interlocutory review under § 1292(b)." (Resp. App. B-8.)

On May 31, 1994, the Ninth Circuit denied BEST FILM'S petition for permission to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). (Resp. App. C-1.) ASTAIRE'S unequivocal change in position, initially opposing certification and now vigorously in favor of it, is yet another factor supporting the Ninth Circuit's decision to deny ASTAIRE'S request for certification.

IV.

REHEARING WAS PROPERLY DENIED SINCE THE COURT OF APPEALS CONSIDERED ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION IN RENDERING ITS OPINION.

"The purpose for petitions for rehearing . . . is to ensure that the panel properly considered all *relevant* . . . information in rendering its decision." (emphasis added) (See *Armster v. United States Dist. Ct.,* 806 F.2d 1347, 1356 (9th Cir. 1986).) Rehearing *en banc* will ordinarily only be ordered when necessary to resolve an intra-circuit conflict or when "the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." (Fed. Rule App. Proc. 35 (a).) Rehearing, and especially rehearing *en banc,* is both inappropriate and unnecessary since the issue here is purely one of statutory interpretation that implicates no federal interest.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated above, the Ninth Circuit's decision to deny certification of the state question to the California Supreme Court was supported by both substantive and procedural facts in the record and therefore should not be disturbed. Particularly, ASTAIRE'S failure to advise this Court that it sought certification of the state law question after the appeal had been finally determined and therefore certification was inappropriate under California Rules of Court, Rule 29.5, the further significant delays caused by certification in this case and the fact that there is no important question of federal law presented show this case does not merit review.

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Dated: July 24, 1998

Respectfully submitted.

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BEST FILM VIDEO CORP., a corporation,
Petitioner,

v.

ROBYN ASTAIRE, an individual,
Respondent.

PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. 1292(b)

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. CV 90-0261 KN

(Honorable David V. Kenyon and Honorable Irving Hill)

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CORPORATION DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Petitioner Best Film & Video Corp. ("Best Film") states that it has not issued shares to the public. Furthermore, Best Film does not have any parent company, subsidiary or affiliate which has issued shares to the public.

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I.
PREFATORY STATEMENT

Petitioner Best Film & Video Corp. ("Best Film") hereby petitions for permission to appeal following certification by the United States District Court of the sole controlling question of law in this action: Does mere use of public domain film clips of a deceased celebrity's likeness in instructional videotapes violate the right of publicity under California Civil Code § 990 where there is no use of the celebrity's likeness for advertising or selling the videotapes and where the use is reasonably related to the videotapes' educational message?[1] The District Court answered that question "Yes," raising issues of importance and first impression in this Court and in California concerning: (1) the scope of the right of publicity under § 990; (2) the potential conflict with and preemption by Federal Copyright law; and (3) the potential inconsistency of a broad interpretation of § 990 with the First Amendment. Recognizing that these issues are dispositive of this action and raise questions of significant public interest, the District Court properly certified this case for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Best Film respectfully urges this

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[1] Annexed hereto as Exhibit A is the Order of the United States District Court dated March 30, 1994 certifying the attached orders for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and amending the Orders from which an immediate appeal is now sought. That Order amends each of the prior Orders of the United States District Court that are the subject of this Petition. Each of these Orders — dated November 26, 1990, July 17, 1991, and March 11, 1994, respectively — concern issues of law determined on Motions for Summary Judgment. These three Orders are appended to this Petition as Exhibits B, C and D, respectively. The Court's November 26, 1990 Order, Exhibit B, was made orally. *See* Exhibit B, Transcript of November 26, 1990 proceedings, at p. 63, lines 13–24, adopting the tentative decision previously set out at pp. 25–36. Each of these determinations of law relate directly to the same controlling issue of law now raised in this Petition.

Court to permit an immediate appeal pursuant to that certification.

As originally brought, this case involved claims by Robyn Astaire, the widow of the late entertainer Fred Astaire against Ronby Corporation (the owner of the Fred Astaire Dance Studio Franchise, co-producer of the videotapes in question and the licensee of the right to use Fred Astaire's name, image and likeness related thereto) and against Petitioner Best Film (a co-producer and licensed distributor of videotapes through Ronby). Respondent Robyn Astaire asserted that the production and distribution of the videotapes violated license agreements Fred Astaire had granted during, his lifetime for operation of the Fred Astaire Dance Studios utilizing his name, image and likeness, and otherwise violated trademarks and amounted to acts of unfair competition. On Motion for Summary Judgment, Respondent's claims for violation of trademark and unfair competition were dismissed. Respondent's breach of license claims brought against Ronby Corp., the operator of the Fred Astaire Dance Studios, were also dismissed by a settlement that did not include Best Film. Thus, the only issue remaining is Respondent's claim that the mere use of 93 seconds of public domain film clips of Astaire dancing in instructional dance videotapes authorized by Ronby Corp. violates the right of publicity granted to a deceased celebrity under California Civil Code § 990.

The controlling issue of law that is the subject of this Petition is not simply case dispositive here, in its broader terms it is an issue of great significance in this Information Age. Can a celebrity or that celebrity's heirs prevent the duplication and incorporation of public domain materials (be they films clips, photographs or other media) in a medium of expression (be it a videotape, book or a CD ROM) by use of California's statutory right of publicity? Here, a celebrity's heirs seek invoke California's statutory

right of publicity protections to prevent duplication and incorporation of public domain material in a medium of expression. They do so in a context devoid of improper association of the celebrity's name with a product or any possible casting of that celebrity in a false light. The most obvious implication is that allowing such an unprecedented extension of the publicity right runs afoul of, and is pre-empted by, the Copyright Act. Moreover, § 990 itself expressly exempts such a use unless it is an "advertisement or commercial announcement." Cal. Civ. Code § 990(n).[2] Finally, as a matter of settled case law, a right of publicity claim must be accompanied by the added element of use for advertising and selling — an element which removes such a claim from copyright preemption and potential violation of First Amendment rights inherent if mere use is actionable. As the Court below has found as a matter of law, there simply is no use for advertising or selling in this case.

No court has ever addressed the issue of mere use standing alone. Right of publicity cases are almost always directed to use for advertising and selling — which is totally absent here. *See, e.g., White v. Samsung Electronics. Inc.*, 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), *cert. denied*, __U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 2443, 124 L.Ed.2d 660 (1993) Vanna White's image used to sell electronic products); *Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.*, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), *cert. denied*, __U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 1047 (1993) (singer Tom Waits' image used to sell snack food); *Midler v. Ford Motor, Co.*, 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (singer Bette Midler's image used to sell automobiles). And no court has ever held what the District Court has held here: that unconsented use in any manner is a *per se* violation of the publicity right granted under § 990 if

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[2]That exception provides in relevant part: "This Section [§ 990] shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's . . . likeness in . . . a film . . . or television program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement." Cal. Civ. Code § 990(n)(1).

that use is on "products, merchandise or goods," which the Court below has interpreted to mean a videotape or, presumably, any other protected medium of expression. Indeed, the decision of the Court below on the controlling question of law represents a significant, if not radical, extension of the right publicity, which necessarily assumes a "substantial basis for a difference of opinion" under Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Determination of this fundamental issue is compelled by the greater public interest. At the same time, because it is entirely case dispositive, its determination at this juncture will "materially advance the termination of this litigation" within the meaning of Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. This controlling question is the sole remaining issue in this case and one which must ultimately be decided in this Court. It should be decided at this juncture. Otherwise, if this Petition is not granted, it will compel the case to be pretried again. Then the case would proceed to trial on damages under a legal standard that has no precedent and no guidelines as to what such a damages phase would entail. On the other hand, if a legal standard is determined by this Court with finality, it will allow the Parties to be able to evaluate their respective positions in this action — related not only to trial, if any is required, but also the Parties' rights to attorneys' fees after what has amounted now to years of litigation. Thus, the District Court was entirely correct in certifying this issue for appeal — recognizing the unnecessary waste of judicial resources that further proceedings in the District Court would entail prior to determination of this issue of law in this Court, where this determining issue must be decided in any event.

II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Factual Background

This case involves the production and distribution of instructional dance videotapes under the auspices of, and pursuant to a license from Ronby Corp., the owner of the Fred Astaire Dance Studios. The Fred Astaire Dance Studios were founded by Fred Astaire and one Chester Casanave in 1946 and utilized a step-by-step method of dance instruction developed by Mr. Astaire himself. Mr. Astaire withdrew from the business in 1953 and sold his rights under a contract that granted him a 40-year royalty from the Company's revenues while reserving for Mr. Casanave the right to continue the dance teaching business. Pursuant to these agreements, Mr. Astaire expressly gave Mr. Casanave the license to franchise dance studios under the trademark "Fred Astaire Dance Studios" and "Fred Astaire Franchised Dance Studios," and the right to market dance instructional materials using the name, image and likeness of Fred Astaire.

This license was renewed in 1965 after the Fred Astaire Dance Studios Corporation changed its name to Ronby Corporation. By written agreement dated January 15, 1965, Mr. Astaire granted Ronby a "perpetual exclusive right and license to use . . . the name 'Fred Astaire' in connection with the conduct and operation of dance studios and schools and related activities" as well as "the right to utilize pictures, photographs and other likenesses of [Mr. Astaire] as had been previously used, and new photographs and likenesses as [Mr. Astaire] may approve in writing." For this agreement, Fred Astaire received an additional $155,000.

On August 3, 1987, following Mr. Astaire's death, Respondent Robyn Astaire — the widow of Fred Astaire and his alleged successor-in-interest — filed a Registration

of Claim under § 990 with the California Secretary of State. In that Registration, Respondent claimed 100% of the rights to Fred Astaire's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness "except for the right to franchise and to cause to be operated, dance studios under the name and image of Fred Astaire."

On March 15, 1989, Ronby and Best Film entered into an agreement to co-produce a series of dance instructional videotapes using the Fred Astaire Dance Studios' distinctive and proprietary dance curriculum. Five instructional videotapes were produced, which range in length from 37 to 43 minutes. Each videotape opens with 93 seconds of dance scenes taken from two Fred Astaire movies, both of which predate the formation of the Fred Astaire Dance Studios. These movies, "Royal Wedding," and "Second Chorus," were copyrighted by the studio producing the pictures and each copyright has lapsed without renewal. Therefore, each movie is in the public domain for copyright purposes. Moreover, each of the films is readily available and in distribution by various public domain video distributors.

Best Film began distributing the Fred Astaire Dance Studios instructional videotapes in 1989. As the Court below has found, Best Film has at all times marketed the videotapes in conformity with the Fred Astaire Dance Studios license and without using the film clips in question or other likenesses of Astaire to advertise or sell the videotapes. The jacket of the videotapes identifies them under the Fred Astaire Dance Studios trademark name and contains an authorized quotation from Astaire regarding the importance of good dance instruction in learning to dance. All advertising and marketing materials produced in conjunction with the distribution of the videotapes likewise only identify themselves with the trademark "Fred Astaire Dance Studios" in conformity with the Ronby license and, notably,

Respondent's own § 990 Registration expressly allowing such a use.

B. Procedural History

This action was commenced on December 19, 1989, a few months after the initial release of the instructional videotapes. Although an injunction was sought in the Complaint, Respondent has never attempted to enforce any injunctive remedy. The central thrust of Respondent's Complaint turned upon the right to distribute the videotapes in the first place. In addition, claims were asserted regarding the use of Fred Astaire's name and persona on the jackets and packaging related to the marketing of the videotapes. These claims included the prominent use of Fred Astaire's name and the title for the videotape "Fred Astaire Franchised Dance Studios" along with the prominent use of the quotation by Fred Astaire regarding the significance of good instruction in learning to be a dancer. Respondent Robyn Astaire further claimed that this packaging violated trademarks on the name of Fred Astaire and that the production and distribution of the videotapes amounted to unfair competition under the Lanham Act by appropriating rights in the Astaire image and likeness. With regard to alleged appropriation of publicity rights, the Complaint includes the claim that, in the words of the Complaint's charging allegation:

> "Utilization of the name, photograph and likeness of Fred Astaire . . . for the purpose of advertising and selling . . . Best's video cassette products [violated Respondent's rights under Cal. Civ. Code § 990]." Complaint, Para. 8, p. 3.

Respondent's trademark and unfair competition claims were resolved by summary adjudication in favor of Defendants Best and Ronby on July 17, 1991. *See* order, attached as Exhibit C. The Court also held that the videotapes themselves were properly part of the instructional activities

of the Fred Astaire Dance Studios as authorized by Fred Astaire and that the production and marketing of the videotapes under the name of the Fred Astaire Dance Studios did not violate Astaire's publicity rights. The Court further held that Best Film was licensed to use the Fred Astaire name and image on its packaging and advertising as a matter of federal trademark law. However, consistent with Judge Hill's prior ruling of November 26, 1990, the Court refused to find copyright preemption or that the exception in § 990(n)(1) for uses in film or videotape unrelated to advertising and selling apply here. The Court also found that material issues of fact existed regarding the breach of contract claims between Astaire and Ronby. In July of 1993, Ronby and Respondent settled their claims on terms Respondent has refused to disclose — thus removing any contract claims from this litigation and leaving only the right of publicity claim set forth in this Petition.

On January 10, 1994, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment/summary adjudication. On March 11, 1994, the District Court issued its ruling on these motions. In that Order, the Court made three key findings of fact and law: (1) Best's use of Astaire's likeness as incorporated in the videotapes in itself constitutes a violation of § 990 under the statute's "on or in products, merchandise, or goods" language; (2) Best Film did not use Astaire's likeness in the videotapes for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of the videotapes within the meaning of § 990; and (3) the First Amendment does not protect Best Film's use of Astaire's likeness from a right of publicity claim under § 990.

III.
QUESTION PRESENTED:

Is the mere use of public domain film clips of a deceased celebrity's likeness in instructional videotapes violative of

the right of publicity under California Civil Code § 990 where there is no use for advertising and selling the videotape and where the use is reasonably related to the videotape's educational message?

IV.
STATEMENT OF REASONS WHY A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS EXISTS FOR A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON THE QUESTION PRESENTED

Because the District Court has determined that unconsented use of public domain film clips in the body of an instructional videotape amounts to a *per se* violation of § 990, this case stands in stark contrast to the entire body of California right of publicity law. Thus, a difference of opinion on this controlling question of law within the meaning of Fed.R.App.P. 5 is necessarily stated. The controlling question of law presented here raises four issues upon which this significant difference of opinion is grounded. First, a difference of opinion exists as to whether such a ruling as regards public domain film clips runs directly afoul of the Copyright Act and is therefore preempted as a matter of law. Second, the question is raised as to whether this use falls within the exception found in § 990(n)(1) which provides that "[t]his Section shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in . . . a . . . film . . . or television program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement. . . . Third, the District Court's *per se* definition of § 990 would effectively overrule longstanding case law, embodied in § 990 itself including § 990(n), requiring a showing of use for advertising or selling before a violation of publicity rights can be found. Finally, there is a significant question as to whether this *per se* rule, where it is applied to bar instructional materials that utilize a deceased personality's image

and likeness, is in itself violative of First Amendment principles.

A. Use of Public Domain Film Clips Cannot Be Barred by State Law Because of Copyright Preemption

The effect, or a portion thereof, of the Court's ruling on the controlling issue of law in this case is to determine that any use *(i.e.,* mere duplication and incorporation) of a work that has fallen into the public domain is prohibited if that work includes in it the image and likeness of a deceased celebrity who has not consented to such a use.[3] In this way, the Court has interpreted § 990 so as to place it on a collision course with the Copyright Act. If it is entirely lawful to duplicate public domain film clips of Fred Astaire and incorporate them in another work under federal copyright law (which it is), state law cannot render that same duplication and use a misappropriation unless consent is obtained. But that is precisely the effect of the Court's ruling below. If § 990 applies to the mere duplication and incorporation of public domain film clips including the image of a celebrity (the only "use" in this case), then that celebrity or his heirs can effectively prohibit such a use as unauthorized. To give such an interpretation to § 990 would be to create a state right that is in direct conflict with what is lawful under the Copyright Act. Such a *per se* rule is clearly preempted by the Copyright Act.

There is no question that the films from which these clips are taken were at one time the proper subject of copyright under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) and that these films have fallen into the public domain. There is also no question that the

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[3]It bears emphasis that Fred Astaire has never owned, and does not own, any interest in the copyrights to the films in question or the clips from them. The copyrights to these films lapsed years ago. In any event, Astaire's own performances were undoubtedly "works for hire" under 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), thus depriving him of any copyright claim.

copyright holder, while it held a valid, existing copyright, had the right to authorize the use of its copyrighted film or excerpts therefrom. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a). And, so long as that use involved only duplication and incorporation in another work, no one but the copyright holder would have the right to authorize or refuse to authorize such a use. *Id.* Once the film is in the public domain, the rights of the copyright holder are lost and cannot be regained by anyone else, including the heirs of a deceased celebrity by operation of state law. *Id.; see e.g.,* 1 Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, *Nimmer On Copyright,* § 2.03[G] (1993).

As the United States Supreme Court held in *Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,* 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964): "...a state may not, when an article is unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for such copying..." This rule was aptly summarized in the companion case of *Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,* 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964): "[W]hen an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to copy that article."

This rule of preemption has been applied in California to bar claims of misappropriation under an unfair competition theory — essentially what is entailed in the right of publicity claim here — where public domain material is involved. In *Sammons & Sons v. Ladd-Fab, Inc.,* 138 Cal.App.3d 306, 311, 187 Cal.Rptr. 874, 877–878 (1982), the Court held:

> "The applicability of the *Sears* and *Compco* doctrine having been demonstrated, we turn to the question whether that doctrine is consistent with the continue recognition of misappropriation by copying of public domain matter as a basis for unfair competition claims. We conclude that, though such copying may be an element in an otherwise unlawful competitive scheme, unfair competition claims may not be based *solely* upon such copying."

See also Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,435 F.2d 711, 717 (9th, Cir. 1970).

Other courts have similarly found that the exclusive federal right preempts equivalent state law rights, including right of publicity claims that are premised on a use identical to that encompassed by the Copyright Act. *Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc.*, 805 F.2d 663, 674–79 (7th Cir. 1986); *Motown Records Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co.*, 657 F.Supp. 1236, 1240–41 (C.D. Cal. 1987).

The case now before the Court deals solely with the issue of copying use as amounting to a misappropriation. The Court below held that Respondent's allegations that Petitioner used the film clips for advertising and selling were without substance. Respondent has alleged no other act that would otherwise differentiate this claim from one solely involving the mere duplication and incorporation of the film clips in question in instructional materials. That use of public domain materials is permitted by the Copyright Act and, as a matter of federal preemption, cannot be inhibited by the overbroad interpretation of § 990 advanced by the Court below. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).

B. The Present Section 990 Claim Is Barred by Section 990(n)'s Exception for Use Involving Film

As discussed above, California's statutory right of publicity cannot intrude upon uses that are otherwise the subject of copyright. In this regard, the California Legislature was careful in drafting § 990 to provide for an explicit and unqualified exception for the application of publicity rights to film unless the use is in "an advertisement or commercial announcement." As provided by § 990(n)(1):

> "This Section shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any of the following instances: (1) a . . .

> film . . . or television program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement . . . ."

The use by Best Film of film clips in these instructional videotapes falls squarely within the express exceptions set forth on the face of the statute. This analysis applies whether the issue is mere use of the film clips themselves or whether instructional videotapes are considered within the exception in their entirety. Application of the exception here is even clearer because the District Court in this case has found that there was no use in "an advertisement or commercial announcement."

Nonetheless, despite the lack of any limiting language in § 990(n), the Court below has read that Section to apply only to "bibliographical works." *See* Minute Order dated November 19, 1993, page 2, n.1, appended hereto as Exhibit E. The court has never described how or why it reached this conclusion. There is no case authority supporting such an interpretation, nor does the Legislative history of § 990 shed any light on construing such a limitation to the § 990(n) exception. The exception set forth in § 990(n) should be found to apply here.

C. There Can Be No Right of Publicity Claim Absent a Showing of Use for Purposes of Advertising or Selling

Under settled case authority, the right of publicity — whether under § 990 as related to deceased celebrities, its companion statute California Civil Code § 3344 related to living persons or common law — has never been considered to be a *per se* rule of law. Instead, courts have always considered the context in which a use occurs to be essential. The necessary elements of a claim for a violation of the right of publicity require a commercial exploitation through an unauthorized or unpermitted use of a celebrity's likeness

directly connected to advertising or selling.[4] Thus, the unauthorized use of a celebrity's likeness on or in consumer products, goods or merchandise *(e.g.,* Michael Jordan's name on a basketball or his picture in an advertisement to sell Nike's) is plainly actionable because all elements are present: the use is unauthorized and its sole purpose is for advertising or selling a consumer product, *i.e.,* basketballs or sneakers. However, particularly where the use is in a protected medium of expression (such as a textbook, a documentary film or, as here, an instructional videotape), then the element of a direct connection with advertising and selling is critical. Accordingly, unauthorized use of a celebrity's likeness in a television or print advertisement is actionable, whereas the use of the same likeness in a textbook or other instructional material is not.

There simply is not a single case extending the right of publicity to mere use of a person's likeness in any form of media, be it books, magazines, films or videotapes. Quite to the contrary, it is a long-required element of a claim for statutory violation of California's right of publicity that a plaintiff must establish what is termed a "direct connection" between the alleged unpermitted use and "solicitation of purchases" or in the terms of Respondent's Complaint in the court below, "advertising and selling." *Eastwood v. Superior Court for Los Angeles Co.,* 149 Cal. App.3d 409, 420, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342, 348–349 (1983)(use must be directly connected to commercial exploitation); *Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc.,* 43 Cal.App.3d 880, 896, 118 Cal.Rptr. 370, 381 (1974)(use must be directly connected to commercial exploitation). As one California court

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[4]See citations below. The only exception involves false stories about celebrities, which has no bearing here.

has stated concerning California's statutory right of publicity[5] as applied to living persons:

> "This statute protects the interest in identity by proscribing unauthorized use of another's name or likeness *on specific products or in connection with advertising and sale of services and products." Maheu v. CBS, Inc.*, 201 Cal.App.3d 662, 676, 247 Cal.Rptr. 304, 312 (1988) (emphasis added and citation omitted).

Significantly, the requirement of a direct connection between an unpermitted use and advertising or solicitation of purchases of a product was first articulated in a case, *Johnson v. Harcourt. Brace, Jovanovich,* involving a factual setting strikingly similar to the instant case. *Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich,* 43 Cal.App.3d 880, 894, 118 Cal.Rptr. 370 (1974). In *Johnson,* the plaintiff complained of the mere use of his identity in a history textbook as violating his right of publicity. Discussing *Johnson* under both sections of California's right of publicity statutes (Sec-

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[5] While the court in *Maheu v. CBS, Inc.* was discussing § 3344 which applies the right of publicity to living persons, there is no distinction between § 3344 and § 990 for these purposes. Section 990 of the California Civil Code was enacted on September 30, 1984, to codify the common law right of publicity in California and to provide for the continuation of that right after the death of an individual whose persona was protected. A California statute protecting the right of publicity had originally been enacted in 1972 as Section 3344 of the California Civil Code. In 1984, California reacted to decisions limiting this right to living persons by enacting the parallel provisions of Section 990 for deceased celebrities. Section 3344 was amended at the same time so that its equivalent definition of the right of publicity, Section 3344(a), tracked the language enacted as Section 990(a). The only relevant distinction between the two right of publicity statutes is the inclusion in Section 990, the provision for the rights of deceased personalities applicable here, of the express exemption for uses in creative works including films under Section 990(n).

tions 3344 and 990), McCarthy's authoritative treatise, *The Rights of Publicity and Privacy,* states:

> "Under the 1972 version of § 3344, the California court of appeals held that the use of plaintiff's name and history in finding and returning a large sum of money as the basis for a lesson in a college English textbook was not a prohibited use under § 3344. The court found that such a use of plaintiff's identity was not for purposes of advertising or soliciting purchases of the textbook. The court noted that the plaintiff's name was 'only used as an educational tool in an English textbook' and 'was not a primary reason for the textbook; nor was it a substantial factor in the students' purchase of the book.' *This requirement of a 'direct connection' between the unpermitted use and a commercial purpose is an example of the general rule that mere 'incidental' use of identity, especially as part of the educational content of a book, is not the kind of unpermitted use of identity which triggers infringement of the Right of Publicity.* On the other hand, an unpermitted use which is used to 'attract the attention' of prospective buyers of defendant's product is clearly within both § 3344 and common law rights." § 6.4 [F][2] at p. 6-31 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted).

Based upon this same reasoning, the California Court of Appeal granted summary judgment in favor of a defendant in a case involving a claim that mere use of the likeness of famed surfer Mickey Dora in a documentary violated his publicity rights under § 3344. There, the Court specifically rejected the very argument that Respondent is asserting here — that any use of likeness amounts to a publicity right violation:

> "Though both celebrities and non-celebrities have the right to be free from the unauthorized exploitation of their name and likenesses, every publication of some-

> one's name or likeness does not give rise to an appropriation action." *Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc.*, 15 Cal.App.4th 536, 542, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790, 792 (1993).

The requirement of a direct connection between a use and advertising and/or selling recently has been held to be equally applicable to claims brought under § 990:

> "California Civ. Code Section 990 . . . applies by its language and by legal authority *only* to the exclusively commercial use of [the] persona in merchandise, advertising or endorsements." *Joplin Enter. v. Allen*, 795 F. Supp. 349, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (emphasis added).

Like *Johnson* and *Dora*, *Joplin* is particularly instructive here because it involves mere use in a medium of expression — in Joplin a stage play concerning the late blues singer Janis Joplin. In the play, the persona of Joplin (*i.e.*, her name, image, and likeness) is the play's entire *raison d'etre*. Rejecting the § 990 claim by Joplin's devisees, the Court noted:

> "California Civ. Code § 990 . . . clearly contemplates examining the use of a deceased personality's name, voice, etc., in terms of the total context in which it appears, Where a use is for the purpose of advertising goods or services, it is prohibited. Identical use in the context of a play is protected."[6] *Id.*

The same result was reached by the Ninth Circuit in *Leidholdt v. L.F.P. Inc.*, 860 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1988), *cert. denied*, 489 U.S. 1080, 109 S.Ct. 1532 (1989), involving the use of plaintiff's photograph in a magazine sold for profit — *Hustler* — which was held not to create a cause of

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[6]It bears noting that the *Joplin* Court went on to find, as Best Film urges here, that First Amendment concerns also barred any publicity claim. 795 F.Supp. at 352. *See* § D. below.

action for misappropriation in connection with a constitutionally protected expression of opinion. The present case is squarely in line with *Johnson* and the cases cited above with regard to the use in the videotapes at issue being beyond the scope of a right of publicity claim. Similarly, in *Eastwood v. Superior Court,* 149 Cal.App.3d 409, 417, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342, 347 (1983), the Court held that the direct connection needed to be established is an "additional requirement" for recovery on a right of publicity claim.

The requirement makes eminent good sense. If mere use of a likeness were actionable, every publication, be it a book, magazine, newspaper or videotape containing the photograph, name, voice, signature or likeness of a celebrity, would give rise to *per se* liability for violation of the right of publicity. The limitation provided by the advertising and selling requirement also has the collateral benefit of avoiding the problem of copyright preemption (*i.e.,* no claim based on mere duplication). At the same time, it allows an interpretation of the right of publicity which avoids First Amendment concerns that arise where only mere use is involved.

Precisely because a "direct connection" must be established, cases involving the right of publicity claim, with the sole exception of the "false story" cases cited below, require a showing of use for advertising and selling. In most publicity cases the connection is easily established in relation to some consumer product. *See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,* 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (use in television advertisement of image of race car driver to sell Winston cigarettes); *Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,* 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (use in television commercials of Bette Midler's voice to sell Ford cars); *Waits v. Frito-Lay Inc.,* 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992), *cert. denied,* U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 1047 (1993) (use in radio advertisement of Tom Waits voice to sell Frito-Lay junk food); *White v. Samsung*

Elec. Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) *cert. denied*, ___ U.S. ___ 113 S.Ct. 2443 (1993) (use of Vanna White's image in print advertisements to sell videocassette recorders).

Where the use is in a medium of expression, as opposed to a consumer product, the burden is even higher because of First Amendment concerns — only if the use is predicated upon a false story created to attract the attention of a potential consumer may a right of publicity claim arise. *See e.g., Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd.*, 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982), *cert. denied*, 462 U.S. 1120, 103 S.Ct. 3089 (1983) (knowing falsity in the use of Cher's image in advertising what was represented to be an "exclusive" to the readership of Penthouse's *Forum* as endorsing the magazine); *Eastwood v. Superior Court*, 149 Cal.App.3d 409, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342 (1983) (false cover story of "Love Triangle" supposedly involving Clint Eastwood, Sandra Locke and Tanya Tucker used to sell *National Enquirer*).

However, where a direct connection is *not* established, courts have not hesitated to reject a claim premised on the right of publicity. *See, e.g., Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace. Janovich, supra* (use of plaintiff's identity in textbook not actionable); *Leidholdt v. L.F.P., Inc.*, 860 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1988), *cert. denied*, 489 U.S. 1080, 109 S.Ct. 1532 (1989) (mere use of photo in Hustler, a magazine sold for profit, not sufficient); *Dora V. Frontline Video, Inc.*, 15 Cal.App.4th 536, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790 (1993) (summary judgment affirmed rejecting liability for mere use of surfer Mickey Dora's name and likeness in a "Frontline" television documentary); *Joplin Enter. v. Allen*, 795 F.Supp. 349 (W.D. Wash. 1992) (use of Janis Joplin's persona in biographical play does not result in a right of publicity claim under Section 990); *Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 799 F.Supp. 166, 172-173 (D.D.C. 1992), *aff'd* without opinion, 15 F.3d 1159 (1994) (summary judgment

granted for defendant film company on common law right of publicity claim following from use in a movie of a short clip from a television performance by singer James Brown).

In sum, the entire weight of authority involving rights of publicity precludes extending a right of publicity claim to mere use without a showing of a direct connection to advertising and selling. Best Film submits that the Court should grant permission for this Appeal and declare that this body of law is applicable to this case.

D. If Mere Use of Public Domain Film Clips in Instructional Videotapes Is Actionable Under § 990, Such a Ruling Runs Afoul of Preeminent First Amendment Principles

The use here is in an educational medium and thus one entitled to full First Amendment protection. As noted in the previous discussion, where a use of name, image or likeness occurs in a protected medium of expression, First Amendment concerns further inhibit the scope that is to be afforded a right of publicity claim. McCarthy's treatise states:

> "The place and context of unpermitted use of personal identity are crucial. When a defendant is making unpermitted use of the name of a famous sports figure on a product like a coffee mug, a claim of first amendment immunity for conveying the 'message' — expressing admiration for that person and his or her accomplishments — rings somewhat hollow." McCarthy, *The Rights of Publicity and Privacy,* § 7.6[A] at p. 7-17.

The direct effect of the District Court's ruling is to reduce the videotapes at issue in this case to a "product" like the coffee mug in Professor McCarthy's illustration. But this case does not involve a consumer product such as a coffee mug, it involves a protected medium of expression. The distinction is decisive.

Under California law on the right of publicity, a clear line is drawn between commercial uses and media uses. Pure commercial uses *e.g.,* a celebrity's likeness on a coffee mug or T-shirt) are clearly subject to a right of publicity claim. Where the use, however, is reasonably related to the content of a medium of expression (*i.e.,* book, magazine, videotape or film), the First Amendment prevents a right of publicity claim.[7] This distinction between commercial uses and media uses was articulated by the California Supreme Court in the so-called *Lugosi* and *Valentino* cases. In *Lugosi* (the case that gave rise to the enactment of Section 990), the publicity claim centered upon the use of Bela Lugosi's likeness as Count Dracula on the sale of products such as toy pencil sharpeners, soap products and the like. *Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,* 25 Cal.3d 813, 851, 160 Cal.Rptr. 323, 347 (1979). The *Valentino* decision, on the other hand, concerned the use of silent movie star Rudolph Valentino's likeness in a fictional film. *Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions* ("*Valentino*"), 25 Cal.3d 860, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352 (1979). The two cases were decided simultaneously and are particularly instructive because of the clear demarcation made by the Court between a use for a *product* versus for a *medium of expression.*

The majority of the *Valentino* court, in finding that the use in *Valentino* was constitutionally insulated from a right of publicity claim, clearly articulated the fundamental difference between the two claims for purposes of the right of publicity. Significantly, in the present context, the California Supreme Court did so by defining what is meant by the term

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[7]The only exception would be for "false stories" — wholly inapplicable here.

"product" and how it is distinguishable from a protected medium of expression:

> "[T]he facts underlying *Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, supra,* are substantially different than those in the present case. *Lugosi* involved the use of Bela Lugosi's likeness in connection with the sale of such commercial products 'as plastic toy pencil sharpeners, soap products, target games, candy dispensers and beverage stirring rods.' (*Id.,* 160 Cal.Rptr. at p. 333, 603 P.2d at 435 (dis. opn.).) These objects, unlike notion pictures, are not vehicles through which ideas and opinions are regularly disseminated. (*See Hicks V. Casablanca Records, supra,* 464 F.Supp. at p. 430.) This case involves the use of a celebrity's identity in a constitutionally protected medium of expression, a work of fiction on film." *Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions,* 25 Cal.3d 860, 874-75, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 361 (1979).

Therefore, the *Valentino* court concluded that First Amendment concerns precluded a right of publicity claim regarding mere incorporation of Valentino's likeness in the film. The court further held that First Amendment concerns even prevented a claim for use of his likeness in advertising the film. The court stated:

> "A cause of action-for the appropriation of Valentino's right of publicity through the use of his name and likeness in respondents' film may not be maintained. The trial court properly sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint."
>
> *"A similar result is compelled for the use of Valentino's name and likeness in advertisements for the film.* That use was merely an adjunct to the exhibition of the film. It was not alleged that the advertisements promoted anything but the film. Having established that

> any interest in financial gain in producing the film did not affect the constitutional stature of respondents' undertaking, it is of no moment that the advertisement may have increased the profitability of the film. It would be illogical to allow respondents to exhibit the film but effectively preclude any advance discussion or promotion of their lawful enterprise. *Since the use of Valentino's name and likeness in the film was not an actionable infringement of Valentino's right of publicity, the use of his identity in advertisements for the film is similarly not actionable. Id.*, 25 Cal.3d 872-73, 160 Cal.Rptr. at 360 (emphasis added).

Courts since *Valentino* have consistently' hewed to its First Amendment distinctions, even where First Amendment content was questionable. *See e.g., Cher V. Forum Int'l, Ltd.*, 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982); *Eastwood v. Superior Court*, 149 Cal.App.3d 409, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342 (1983) (both courts required a showing of falsity related to use after extensive discussion of First Amendment concerns). Indeed, even prior to *Valentino*, the *Johnson* court protected the commercial publication of instructional materials from a right of publicity claim. *Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, supra.* Of particular significance, since the *Valentino* decision, its distinction between uses on products versus medium of expression has been consistently upheld. *See Eastwood, Leidholdt, Maheu, Dora,* and *Joplin.*

Most recently, this distinction and deference to First Amendment concerns has been applied to § 990 in particular. In *Joplin*, although ruling that the claim was not actionable under § 990 because of the absence of any showing of a direct use for merchandising, advertising, or endorsement, the court nonetheless stated its conclusion

with respect to the "clear direction in which constitutional law points," namely that:

> " '[t]he protection of the right of free expression is so important that we should not extend *any* right of publicity . . . to give rise to a cause of action against publication of a . . . work about a deceased person.' " *Joplin Enter. v. Allen*, 795 F. Supp. at 352 (quoting *Frosh v. Grosset & Dunlap Inc.*, 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829 (App. Div. 1980)).

It bears noting that the category of persons who would be entitled to make such claims would not be limited merely to entertainers such as Fred Astaire, Charlie Chaplin or Elvis, it would also potentially include historical figures such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.[8]

Of course, in this case where it is established that the use at issue is not only in a medium of expression but also educational in content (*e.g.*, instructional videotapes), the use is plainly at the core of the First Amendment and constitutionally immune from any claim:

> "If information on 'public issues' is within the core of strong first amendment protection and immune from appropriation privacy and Right of Publicity liability, then educational and scholarly uses of a person's identity clearly must also be immune. Of course, the qualification must be that there is a reasonable relationship between the person's identity and the educational

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[8]Thus, while the right of publicity has been extended to an historical figure such as Dr. King, *Martin Luther King Center v. American Heritage Products, Inc.*, 250 Ga. 135, 296 S.E.2d 697, 216 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 711 (1982) (extending the right of publicity to unauthorized merchandise — plastic busts — containing the likeness of Dr. King), it is unimaginable that the right of publicity could be extended to mere use of Dr. King's name and likeness in a protected medium of expression.

> or scholarly message. Since students identify with a known person, the use of the name or photo of a celebrity in a text book to illustrate a lesson has real educational value. The textbook is more saleable, not because it contains the name or photo of a celebrity per se, but because that use makes the book a more effective educational tool. Certainly people active in the spheres of politics, economics, science and the arts must expect their identities to be used without payment to illustrate the content of books, articles and films which teach or comment upon those fields." McCarthy, *The Rights of Publicity and Privacy Section,* § 8.8 [B][3] at p. 8-48.

The considerations apply with equal force here. And it should be noted in this regard that, contrary to what the court below has implied, the fact of a "commercial use" (*i.e.*, sale of the videotapes for a profit) has absolutely no bearing on Respondent's right of publicity claim any more than if the claim was being made against *The New York Times* or Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich. *Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson*, 343 U.S. 495, 501–502, 72 S.Ct. 777, 780 (1952). The only inquiry on a right of publicity analysis under the First Amendment is whether the use is reasonably related to the content of the expression. *Eastwood v. Superior Court*, 149 Cal.App.3d 409, 419, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342, 348 (1983). Indeed, this requirement is codified in California Civil Code § 990(k). In this case, there can be no *bona fide* question that the use was directly related to the content of the instructional videotapes themselves. A brief glimpse of Fred Astaire dancing in the context of an instructional videotape teaching the viewer to dance "the Fred Astaire Way" bears an obvious relationship to the content of the instructional materials. Inspirational, aspirational and instructive in themselves, the film clips underscore the essential premise with which Fred Astaire started the Fred Astaire Dance Studios in the first place: "Learn to dance

like me." Images of Fred Astaire dancing bear an obvious relationship to the videotapes' instructional content. It would be plainly contrary to the most fundamental First Amendment precepts to allow the operation of § 990 to enable the heirs of a deceased celebrity to effectively censor the videotapes' content. But that is precisely the effect of the lower Court's ruling.

As the discussion above demonstrates, therefore, the context in which the public domain film clips were used is plainly one protected by the First Amendment from any right of publicity claim. This claim to immunity is only strengthened by Respondent's own Section 990 Registration. In that Registration, Respondent exempts from her claim to Section 990 rights "the right to franchise and cause to be operated, dance studios under the name and image[9] of Fred Astaire." As the Court below has found, the videotapes at issue are properly part of the operation of the Fred Astaire Dance Studios.

Accordingly, under plainly established case law, the mere use of public domain film clips of Fred Astaire in instructional videotapes is immune from liability under the right of publicity as a matter of constitutional prerogative. First Amendment considerations stand, therefore, as a separate and distinct legal basis upon which Respondent's right of publicity claims are precluded.

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[9]"Image" is defined as "an imitation or representation of a person or thing, drawn, painted, photographed, etc." *Webster's New World Dictionary*, Third College Edition (1988).

V.
DETERMINATION OF THE CONTROLLING ISSUE OF LAW IN THIS CASE WILL MATERIALLY ADVANCE THE TERMINATION OF THE LITIGATION

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, there is a significant difference of opinion with regard to the rule of law enunciated by the District Court. It is equally clear that the determination of this issue at this juncture will materially advance the termination of this litigation. Indeed, determination of the issue by this Court is effectively case dispositive. Either this Court will refuse to sanction the unprecedented *per se* application of § 990 and end this case in this Court, or a new legal standard will be enunciated in which the parties' respective rights will be definitively settled.

Unless this important issue is determined by this Court, it will lead the Parties into further potentially needless proceedings in this case that will be so uncertain in their scope and dimension as to make resolution of this case by settlement impossible and will only necessitate a further appeal of the question presented in precisely the form in which it is presented here. Therefore, Petitioner submits that it does not make sense to force the Parties to go through the great costs and expense of a damages trial — which Petitioner estimates will take at least a week of trial time in addition to pretrial preparation, expert depositions, etc. Again, because of the unprecedented nature of the ruling of the Court below, the uncertainty that the Parties will face in such a damages phase will require an appeal by either Party as a matter of necessity.

At this juncture, it should also be noted that the Parties have expended a significant amount of resources over years of litigation. While much of this litigation has involved Ronby Corporation and Respondent arguing about the scope

of license agreements, trademark rights and issues related to the operation of the Fred Astaire Dance Studios with which Petitioner has no involvement, Respondent will undoubtedly claim a broad right to all attorneys' fees and costs arising from the § 990 claim that is now the focus of the litigation. These attorneys' fees and costs therefore have become a significant bone of contention, if not the major bone of contention in this case. Resolution of the issue now before this Court will fully and finally determine that question at least in terms of the Parties' rights and liabilities. This further demonstrates that hearing this appeal at this juncture will materially advance this litigation and avoid needless duplication of resources where it is inevitable that this case, which now involves only the controlling question presented here, will have to be decided by this Court in any event.

VI.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner respectfully requests that Petitioner be entitled to pursue an immediate appeal in this case.

Dated: April 7, 1994

Respectfully submitted,
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Best Film & Video Corp.

No. 94-80135
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BEST FILM VIDEO CORP., a corporation,
Petitioner,
v.
ROBYN ASTAIRE, an individual,
Respondent.

ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. 1292(b)

APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

No. CV 90-0261 KN

(Hon. David V. Kenyon and Hon. Irving Hill)

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Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 5(b), Respondent Robyn Astaire ("Mrs. Astaire") respectfully submits this answer in opposition to the petition for permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (the "Petition") filed by Best Film & Video Corporation ("Best").

I.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In its Petition, Best seeks an immediate appeal from the district court's orders of March 8, 1994, July 17, 1991, and November 26, 1990 (the "Orders"), establishing Best's liability under California Civil Code Section 990. Specifically, Best seeks interlocutory review of the district court's determinations that Best's use of Fred Astaire's likeness in videotapes violated Section 990; that Best's conduct is not protected by the First Amendment; and that Section 990 is not preempted by the federal Copyright Act. Best's Petition should be denied, because Best has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that an extraordinary, immediate appeal from the Orders is appropriate under the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

First, Best has failed to establish that an immediate appeal would "materially advance the ultimate termination" of this litigation, as required by Section 1292(b). To the contrary, Best's Petition would, if granted, serve to ensure that the district court proceedings in this case (which have already lasted more than five years) would be delayed for at least an additional 12 – 18 months pending briefing, argument, and decision in this court. This is so because regardless of this court's disposition of the issues raised by Best, further proceedings would be required in the district court, and further appeals to this court would almost certainly ensue. on the other hand, if this court were to deny the Petition, this case could be tried in a few days in the district

court, and all relevant issues could then be presented to this court in a single appeal from a final judgment. In short, there is little to be gained from forcing this court and Mrs. Astaire to undergo the burden, inconvenience, and considerable delay that would result from an interlocutory appeal, and thus there is no basis for concluding that immediate review would "materially advance the ultimate termination" of this case.

In addition, Best has failed to show that "there is substantial ground for, difference of opinion" over the questions on which Best seeks interlocutory appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court's rulings accord with settled law and with the language, purpose, and legislative history of California Civil Code Section 990. Best is unable to cite any persuasive authority to the contrary, and thus its Petition should be denied on that ground as well.

Finally, the Petition should be denied as a matter of this court's discretion because this case manifestly does not present the sort of exceptional circumstances that are generally required before this court will accept such interlocutory review under § 1292(b).

II.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual Background

Respondent Mrs. Astaire is Fred Astaire's widow. She has succeeded to all rights in the name, voice, signature, photograph, likeness, and general right of publicity in Fred Astaire's persona, including all rights under California civil Code Section 990. She was granted those rights under the terms of the Fred Astaire Trust, dated December 31, 1985. *See* Plaintiff's Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts and Conclusions of Law ("Separate Statement"), No. 2. In addition, she obtained all of Fred Astaire's show business

rights pursuant to a written agreement dated April 1988, which was signed by all of the trustees and beneficiaries of the Fred Astaire Trust. Separate Statement, No. 3. Mrs. Astaire has complied with the statutory registration requirements contained in California Civil Code Section 990(f) by registering her claim with the California Secretary of State. Separate Statement, No. 4.

Petitioner Best is a New York corporation, engaged in the business of manufacturing, producing, marketing, distributing and selling prerecorded video cassettes throughout the United States. Separate Statement, No. 7. Ronby Corporation ("Ronby") is a Florida corporation which, at the time this lawsuit was initiated, operated the Fred Astaire Franchised Dance Studios pursuant to a January 15, 1965 written license agreement and earlier written agreements with Fred Astaire. Separate Statement, No. 5. The Fred Astaire Franchised Dance Studios provide dancing instruction to their students. Separate Statement, No. 6.

Since October of 1989, more than two years after Mr. Astaire's death, Best has been distributing video cassettes known as the "Fred Astaire Dance Series," with individual titles "Swing," "Top 40," "Latin Dancing," "Ballroom," and "Country Western Dancing" (the "Video Cassettes"). Separate Statement, No. 8. The Video Cassettes contain photographs of Fred Astaire as well as film clips of performances of Fred Astaire taken from two of his films, "Royal Wedding" and "Second Chorus," which were released in 1951 and 1941, respectively. Separate Statement, No. 9.

Best produced, distributes, advertises and markets the Video Cassettes outside the Ronby dance schools. Separate Statement, No. 10. As part of its marketing campaign, Best showed the Video Cassettes in the summer of 1989 at a trade show attended by 100,000 of its customers, including its retail buyers and others. Separate Statement, No. 11. In

addition, Best gave away many copies of the Video Cassettes as promotional items to its retail buyers, various media and others. Separate Statement, No. 12.

Best concedes that it never sought or obtained permission to utilize the film clips of Fred Astaire in the Video Cassettes. Separate Statement, No. 14. Nor did Best obtain permission to utilize the many photographs of Mr. Astaire in the Video Cassettes. Separate Statement, No. 15.

B. Procedural History

Mrs. Astaire filed this action against Best and Ronby in December 1989, shortly after Best began distributing the Video Cassettes containing the film clips and photographs of Fred Astaire. Mrs. Astaire asserted claims against Best for misappropriation of her publicity rights under California Civil Code Section 990; trademark, trade name, and service mark infringement; unfair competition; and violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).[1]

In late 1990, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. On November 26, 1990, the district court denied those motions without prejudice to their renewal before trial. *See* Minute Order dated Nov. 26, 1990 (attached hereto as Exhibit A).

On July 17, 1991, the district court granted summary judgment for Best and Ronby on Mrs. Astaire's trademark and unfair competition claims. *See* Order re Motions for Summary Judgment, filed July 17, 1991 ("7/17/91 Order"), reproduced at Petition, Exh. C, at 4. The court also ruled that Mrs. Astaire's right-of-publicity claim under California Civil Code Section 990 was not preempted by the

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[1] Mrs. Astaire asserted the same claims, as well as a claim for breach of contract, against Ronby. Mrs. Astaire and Ronby entered into a settlement agreement in July 1993, however, and Ronby is no longer a party to this litigation.

federal Copyright Act (*id.* at 2, 3), and that the production and marketing of the Video Cassettes under Fred Astaire's name did not, standing alone, constitute a violation of Mrs. Astaire's right of publicity. *Id.* at 2; *see also* Order of March 8, 1994, reproduced at Petition, Exh. D ("3/8/94 Order"), at 2.

Thereafter, the district court set a trial date of February 15, 1994, and the parties filed new summary judgment motions. On March 8, 1994, the court granted summary judgment for Mrs. Astaire, ruling that Best had violated her rights under Section 990 by using Fred Astaire's likeness "on or in products," namely, the Video Cassettes. 3/8/94 Order at 2 – 7. The court granted summary judgment for Best on Mrs. Astaire's claim that Best had violated her rights under section 990 by using the film clips and photographs of Fred Astaire for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products. *Id.* at 7 – 9. The court rejected Best's claims that Fred Astaire had waived any right to control the use of his likeness and that the First Amendment barred imposition of liability on Best in the circumstances of this case. *Id.* at 9 – 2.

On March 30, 1994, the district court certified its orders of November 26, 1990, July 17, 1991, and March 11, 1994, for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and stayed all proceedings in the district court. *See* Order of March 30, 1994, reproduced at Petition, Exh. A ("3/30/94 Order"). Best thereafter filed its Petition seeking leave to appeal. Mrs. Astaire did not seek leave of this court to obtain interlocutory review of any rulings of the district court.

III.
ARGUMENT

Best bears the burden of demonstrating that exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the basic policy of

postponing appellate review until after the entry of final judgment. *Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,* 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978). First, Best must persuade this court that each of the certification requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) has been met. *In re Cement Antitrust Litigation,* 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982), *aff'd sub nom. Arizona v. Ash Grove Cement Co.,* 459 U.S. 1190 (1983). These requirements are threefold: (1) the challenged order of the district court must "involve[ ] a controlling question of law"; (2) there must be "substantial ground for difference of opinion" with respect to that question; and (3) it must be shown that "an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Second, in addition to satisfying each of the statutory requirements, Best must demonstrate that this court should, in the exercise of its discretion under Section 1292(b), depart from the strong federal policy against piecemeal appeals: "§ 1292(b) is to be applied sparingly and only in exceptional cases." *United States v. Woodbury,* 263 F.2d 784, 788 n.11 (9th Cir. 1959). *See Coopers & Lybrand,* 437 U.S. at 475 (only " 'exceptional circumstances justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment' "); *In re Cement Antitrust Litig.,* 673 F.2d at 1026 (noting that, even if petitioner satisfies the requirements of Section 1292(b), "[t]he second step in our analysis is . . . to decide whether, in the exercise of the discretion granted us by the statute, we want to accept jurisdiction").

Best has failed to establish that this proposed appeal satisfies the certification requirements set forth in Section 1292(b). Moreover, even if Best could satisfy those requirements, the Petition would nonetheless lack merit, because Best cannot demonstrate the existence of "exceptional circumstances" justifying the exercise of this court's

discretion to authorize an interlocutory appeal. Best's Petition should therefore be denied.

A. An Immediate Appeal Will Not "Materially Advance The Ultimate Termination" Of This Litigation

Section 1292(b) permits an interlocutory appeal only when immediate appellate review "may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). For three reasons, Best cannot meet its burden of demonstrating that its proposed interlocutory appeal satisfies this statutory requirement.

1. The Question On Which Best Seeks Interlocutory Appeal Cannot Dispose Of This Case

In the first place, Best is simply wrong in asserting that determination of this attempted interlocutory appeal would be "effectively case dispositive." Petition at 33. Indeed, that assertion is belied by Best's admission (*id.* at 34) that the issue of attorney's fees is "a significant bone of contention, if not the major bone of contention in this case." Obviously, if the issue of attorney's fees — an issue that is not presented on this interlocutory appeal — is "the major bone of contention in this case," this court cannot dispose of the case on interlocutory review no matter how it decides the question that Best seeks to raise on this appeal.

Moreover, interlocutory review at this stage of the case could not even dispose of the merits of this litigation. As is made plain by Best's phrasing of the question presented by this interlocutory appeal, Best is asking this court to address its statutory and constitutional arguments on the assumption that "there is no use [of Fred Astaire's likeness] for advertising and selling the videotape." Petition at 10. That assumption is based on the district court's rejection of Mrs. Astaire's claim in her summary judgment papers that

Best used the film clips and photographs for purposes of advertising, selling, or soliciting purchases of the Video Cassettes. *See* 3/8/94 Order at 7 - 9.

Mrs. Astaire respectfully disagrees with the district court's ruling in that regard, and reserves the right to challenge it on appeal from a final judgment in this case.[2]

Thus, even in the unlikely event that this court were to agree with Best's legal arguments on this interlocutory appeal, it could not finally resolve Mrs. Astaire's right-of-publicity claim under California Civil Code Section 990. Rather, at least one additional appeal — and potentially a

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[2]Mrs. Astaire presented substantial evidence demonstrating that Best used the film clips and photographs of Fred Astaire for the purpose of selling and advertising, and soliciting purchases of, Best's products. That evidence included the following: (1) Best's decision to include the film clips and photographs in the Video Cassettes to enhance their commercial attractiveness; (2) Best's admission that the use of the clips and photographs was not intended to "add to the teaching content of these videotapes" but was merely "ornamental"; and (3) Best's president's deposition testimony that the Video Cassettes were shown at a trade show and given away for promotional purposes to retail buyers, various media, and others. Although Mrs. Astaire may well challenge the district court's ruling in this regard in a later appeal, she has not sought leave to raise the issue at this time under Section 1292(b), and the time for seeking such leave has now expired. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); Fed. R. App. P. 5(a). Thus, this Court would have no opportunity to address this issue even if Best were allowed to proceed with an interlocutory appeal. *See Luria Steel & Trading Corp. v. Ogden Corp.*, 484 F.2d 1016, 1023 - 24 (3d Cir. 1973) (non-appealing party cannot obtain interlocutory appellate review of unfavorable rulings of district court), *cert. denied*, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974). Of course, the fact that Mrs. Astaire has not sought leave to raise this issue now does not in any way limit her right to raise the issue on appeal from any final judgment that may be entered in this case. *See Balla v. Idaho State Board of Corrections*, 869 F.2d 461, 467 - 68 (9th Cir. 1989) (where party declines to utilize available opportunity for seeking interlocutory appellate review of district court order, the order " 'merges in the final judgement and may be challenged in an appeal from that judgment' ").

trial as well — would be required before that claim could be resolved.[3]

Likewise, if this court were to affirm the district court's rulings, a remand for a trial on damages would be required, and Best (or, possibly, Mrs. Astaire) would presumably bring yet another appeal upon entry of final judgment. Thus, there is no possibility that an interlocutory appeal could result in final resolution of the merits of Mrs. Astaire's right-of-publicity claim.[4]

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[3]Moreover, the district court did not resolve all of Mrs. Astaire's Section 990 claims. In particular, the district court declined to address the question whether Best's use of the photographs — as distinct from the film clips — constitutes a separate violation of Section 990, as Mrs. Astaire has alleged from the beginning of this lawsuit. *See* Complaint, ¶ 8; 3/8/94 Order at 3 n.1 ("The Court need not consider the significance of the photos in its analysis of the 'on or in' language of § 990, of course, because the presence of the film clips is itself adequate for a finding of liability."). This issue would require resolution on remand, however, if this court were to permit interlocutory review and agree with one or more of Best's arguments on appeal.

[4]In addition, Mrs. Astaire reserves the right to seek appellate review of any unfavorable final judgment that may be entered in the district court with respect to her claims against Best for trademark, trade name, and service mark infringement; unfair competition; and violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Those issues were resolved against her on summary judgment by the district court, but that court has not yet entered final judgment with respect to those claims, which present substantial issues for appeal. For example, the district court rejected Mrs. Astaire's Lanham Act claim on the ground that Mrs. Astaire "does not appear to be a competitor of" Best (7/17/91 order at 3); the Ninth Circuit has made clear, however, that a plaintiff in the position of Mrs. Astaire need not be a competitor of the defendant in order to assert a Lanham Act claim. *See Waits v. Frito-Lay Inc.*, 978 F.2d 1093, 1109 - 10 (9th Cir. 1992), *cert. denied*, 113 S.Ct. 1047 (1993). Of course, these issues would not be before this Court on Best's interlocutory appeal, and thus there would be no opportunity for this court to resolve them in the current posture of the case.

2. Interlocutory Appeal Is Inappropriate Because This case Is Almost Ready For Trial And All District Court Proceedings Could Be Completed With Little Additional Burden On The District Court

It is settled law that certification of an interlocutory appeal under Section 1292(b) is inappropriate where the case has progressed to such a point that proceedings in the district court could be concluded without unduly burdening that court. Thus, in *United States v. Woodbury,* this court observed that "Section 1292(b) was intended primarily as a means of expediting litigation by permitting appellate consideration *during the early stages of litigation* of legal questions which, if decided in favor of the appellant, would end the lawsuit." 263 F.2d at 787 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Similarly, this court has made clear that Section 1292(b) certification is available only "in extraordinary cases where decision of an interlocutory appeal might avoid *protracted and expensive litigation.*" *United States Rubber Co. v. Wright,* 359 F.2d 784, 785 (9th Cir. 1966) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); *see Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Manufacturing Co.,* 482 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 1973) (same).

This case is no longer in its "early stages." To the contrary, this case has been proceeding since 1989, and all discovery, except expert depositions and limited damage discovery, has been completed. Indeed, as late as January of this year, the trial was scheduled to begin on February 15, 1994, and thus Mrs. Astaire has already prepared her pretrial documents (including her memoranda of contentions of fact and law, motions in limine, exhibit and witness list, jury instructions and pre-trial conference order), and it is more than likely that Best has done the same.[5]

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[5] Indeed, on January 6, 1994, Best and Mrs. Astaire agreed that both parties' memoranda of contentions of law and fact, motions in limine,

Nor would authorization for an interlocutory appeal serve to "avoid protracted and expensive litigation" in the district court.[6] Even Best suggests that the issue of damages — the only issue currently remaining for trial — could be tried in a week (Petition at 33), and the limited nature of that issue makes it far more likely that the damages phase of this case could be presented to a jury in only two or three days.

Even assuming *arguendo* that a trial on damages would take as long as a week, there is no reason to permit Best to obtain interlocutory review only of a portion of the case at this late stage in proceedings. As one leading treatise observes, "[i]f trial of the case can be had in a few days, the possibility of saving relatively small amounts of trial court time is not thought sufficient to justify immediate appeal." 16 C. Wright, A. Miller, E. Cooper, & E. Gressman, *Federal Practice & Procedure* § 3930, at 163 (1977). *See also Kraus v. Board of County Road Commissioners,* 364 F.2d 919, 922 (6th Cir. 1966) (Section 1292(b) "was not intended to authorize interlocutory appeals in ordinary suits for personal injuries or wrongful death that can be tried and disposed of on their merits in a few days").[7] The mere

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and the joint exhibit list would be due five business days after entry of the district court's order on the motions for summary judgment. It is thus apparent that the parties were operating on the assumption that a trial was imminent.

[6]While expert depositions have yet to be taken, the parties have discussed limiting each side to two experts, and have acknowledged that each of the depositions will most likely last no longer than two hours. Similarly, while Mrs. Astaire has agreed to further document production, the scope of such production is extremely limited, and will result in the production of no more than a handful of documents. For these reasons, there is no reason to believe that outstanding discovery cannot be completed in the next one to two months — at the very latest.

[7]In *Laverne v. Corning,* 316 F. Supp. 629, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), the court denied the defendant's application for permission to seek interlocutory review of the district court's order granting summary judgment for

possibility that the district court might be able to avoid a few days of trial cannot justify interrupting the orderly progress of this litigation and imposing on this court the burden of deciding an additional appeal involving issues that may ultimately be irrelevant to the final disposition of this case.

3. Immediate Appeal Would Not "Materially Advance The Ultimate Termination Of The Litigation" Because It Would Substantially Delay The District Court's Resolution of The Case

Yet another reason for concluding that an interlocutory appeal would not "materially advance the ultimate termination" of this litigation is the fact that an interlocutory appeal would substantially delay the district court's final resolution of this case. This court has made clear that interlocutory appeal is inappropriate where the appeal probably would not be decided before the trial could be completed. In *Shurance v. Planning Control Intern., Inc.*, 839 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir. 1988), the court expressly held that an interlocutory appeal would not "materially advance" termination of the case because "an interlocutory appeal might well have the effect of delaying the resolution of [the] litigation, for an appeal probably could not be completed before" the scheduled trial date. *Accord Kraus v. Board of County Road Commissioners,* 364 F.2d at 922; 16 C. Wright, et al., *Federal Practice & Procedure* § 3930, at 165 – 66 (fact that interlocutory appeal "might well contribute to further delay" is a "good ground for refusing to certify or accept an appeal"). The possibility that an interlocutory appeal will

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plaintiffs on the issue of liability. The court explained that "since the only issue remaining is the determination of the quantum of damages to be awarded plaintiffs, which apparently will not involve expensive and protracted litigation, there is little reason to believe that permitting an appeal from this Court's decision will '*materially* advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.' " *Id.* (footnote omitted). *Laverne's* reasoning is equally applicable here.

delay the ultimate disposition of the case is a "particularly strong ground for denying appeal if certification is sought from a ruling made shortly before a trial expected to be brief." *Id.* § 3930, at 166.

As pointed out above, the damages phase of this case could be tried well before this court would receive briefs on, much less rule on, an interlocutory appeal. Even assuming the trial will last one week, this litigation will still be resolved much sooner if allowed to proceed to trial. The median time interval in the Ninth Circuit between the filing of a notice of appeal and final determination is approximately 15 months. *Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts* 151 (1992). Therefore, even a one-week trial (for which no more than two months would be needed to prepare) could be concluded long before this court would have had the opportunity to address the questions on which Best seeks interlocutory review.

For all the foregoing reasons, this case clearly does not fall within the category of "protracted" and "exceptional" litigation for which Section 1292(b) provides an interlocutory appeal, and Best has not carried its burden of proving that an immediate appeal would "materially advance the ultimate termination" of this litigation. This court should therefore deny Best's Petition.

B. The Challenged District Court Rulings Are Plainly Correct And Are Not Subject To "Substantial" Grounds For Difference Of Opinion

Even if Best could demonstrate that interlocutory review of the questions it seeks to raise would materially advance the ultimate termination of this case, interlocutory review under Section 1292(b), would still be unavailable, because Best has failed to meet its burden of showing that there is a "substantial ground for difference of opinion" about the

correctness of the district court's Orders. The rulings of the district court at issue in this case are correct, and thus there is no basis for interlocutory review under Section 1292(b).

1. There Is No Substantial Ground For Difference of Opinion With Respect To The District Court's Ruling On Preemption Under The Copyright Act

Best's first contention (Petition at 11–14) is that the district court erred in holding that Mrs. Astaire's statutory right of publicity is not preempted by the federal Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).[8] In support of that contention, Best relies primarily on *Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.*, 376 U.S. 225 (1964), *Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.*, 376 U.S. 234 (1964), and their progeny. What Best ignores, however, is the fact that the Supreme Court has since retreated from the "broad pre-emptive principle" of *Sears* and *Compco*. *See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.*, 978 F.2d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing decision in *Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.*, 489 U.S. 141 (1989)), *cert. denied*, 113 S. Ct. 1047 (1993).

Moreover, Best neglects to point out that this court has already rejected arguments analogous to the one that Best seeks to raise here. *See Waits*, 978 F.2d 1099 – 100; *Midler v. Ford Motor Co.*,849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988).[9] In *Waits*, for example, this court noted that the legislative history of the Copyright Act reveals Congress's intent that

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[8] Best's preemption argument relates solely to the use of the film clips. Best does not and cannot contend that all of the photographs of Fred Astaire included in the Video Cassettes are in the public domain, and thus Best's preemption argument provides no defense to Mrs. Astaire's claim regarding Best's use of the photographs. Mrs. Astaire's claim in that regard, of course, has yet to be decided. See *supra* at 10 n.3.

[9] Other courts have reached the same conclusion. *See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts Inc.*, 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), *rev'd on other grounds*, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981); *Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc.*,400 F. Supp. 836, 842–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

the right of publicity and similar state-law causes of action "'remain unaffected [by the Copyright Act] as long as th[os]e causes of action contain elements, *such as an invasion of personal rights* . . . that are different in kind from copyright infringement.'" 978 F.2d at 1100 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Here, as in *Waits*, the right-of-publicity claim "is one for invasion of a personal property right," and thus it is not preempted. *Id.*[10]

2. There Is No Substantial Ground For Difference Of Opinion With Respect To The District Court's Interpretation Of Section 990(n)(1)

Best next contends that the district court erred in rejecting Best's defense based on California Civil Code Section 990(n)(1), which provides that Section 990 "shall not apply to the use of a deceased personality's . . . likeness, in . . . [a] . . . film . . . or television program, other than an advertisement or commercial announcement . . ."[11] That

[10] Best appears to contend (Petition at 14) that the preemption analysis in this case is affected by the district court's ruling that Best did not use the film clips or photographs for purposes of advertising or solicitation. Best does not point to any basis for that contention, however. In any event, as noted above, Mrs. Astaire believes that the district court erred in rejecting the evidence of use in advertising, selling, and solicitation, and she reserves the right to seek appellate review of that ruling after entry of final judgment. Thus, the issue as framed by Best may never require decision by this court.

[11] It is open to question whether this court would have jurisdiction to consider the Section 990(n)(1) issue on an interlocutory appeal. Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is "confined to the particular order appealed from," and thus "'the court of appeals will not consider matters that were ruled upon in other orders.'" *United States v. Stanley*, 483 U.S. 669, 677 (1987) (citation omitted). While Judge Hill, who initially presided over this case, did indicate a tentative view with respect to the Section 990(n)(1) issue at the summary judgment hearing on November 26, 1990 (*see* Petition, Exh. B, at 29 (declining "at least at this movement [sic]" to read Section 990(n) as Best urges), he did not

contention ignores the fact that Best used the film clips and photographs at issue in this case in videotapes, which are neither "film[s]" nor "television program[s]" within the express language of the statute. When the California Legislature intended to include videotapes within the scope of other terms used in Section 990, it did so expressly. *See* Cal. Civ. Code § 990(i) (defining "photograph" to include "any *video tape* or live television transmission") (emphasis added).

In any event, even if videotapes were subject to the provisions of Section 990(n)(1), Best's argument would lack merit. Although the California courts have not yet had occasion to address the issue, leading commentators have concluded that Section 990(n)(1) was intended to exempt "biographies, or accounts from events in the lives, of deceased personalities . . ." Weinstein, *Commercial Appropriation of Name or Likeness Revisited,* 22 Bev. Hills Bar J. 192, 214 (1988); *see also* J.T. McCarthy, *Rights of Publicity & Privacy* § 6.4[F][3][b] (1994). That interpretation is plainly correct; as the district court indicated, Best's contrary interpretation would eviscerate the cause of action recognized in section 990(a). *See* 11/19/93 Order at 2 n.1. The district correctly harmonized subsections (a) and

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purport to resolve that issue in his November 26, 1990, minute order (attached hereto as Exhibit A), and instead indicated that the denial of Best's summary judgment motion was "without prejudice to similar motions" made later. Judge Kenyon expressly rejected Best's Section 990(n)(1) defense in a minute order dated November 19, 1993 ("11/19/93 Order") (reproduced at Petition, Exh. E, at 2 n.1), but the district court did not certify that order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 3/30/94 Order at 1. To be sure, the district court also referred to the Section 990(n)(1) issue in its 3/8/94 Order (which the court did certify for interlocutory appeal), but only to indicate that the court had "already expressed its view" on that subject. 3/8/94 Order at 10 n.8.

(n)(1), while Best would ask this court to excise a critical part of the former from the statute.[12]

3. There Is No Substantial Ground For Difference Of Opinion With Respect To The District Court's Interpretation Of Section 990(a)

Section 990(a) imposes liability on "[a]ny person who uses a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, *on or in products,* merchandise, or goods, *or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases* of, products, merchandise, goods, or services, without prior consent . . ." Cal. Civ. Code § 990(a) (emphasis added). The plain, unambiguous language of that provision requires rejection of Best's claim that the use of a celebrity's likeness "on or in products" is not actionable unless the use is "directly connected to advertising or selling." Petition at 16.[13] In effect, Best seeks to read out of the statute the cause of action for use "on or in products," but the statute's text and legislative history, as well as

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[12]Once again, Best's argument in this regard rests in part on the assumption that the district court properly rejected Mrs. Astaire's claim that Best used the film clips and photographs for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, the Video Cassettes. *See* Petition at 15 (asserting that "[a]pplication of the [Section 990(n)(1)] exception here is even clearer because the District Court in this case has found that there was no use in 'an advertisement or commercial announcement.'"). Because the correctness of the district court's ruling on that issue will not be before this court unless and until Mrs. Astaire seeks appellate review at a later point in the case, review of Best's hypothetical argument at this stage of the proceedings would be premature.

[13]Moreover, this issue, like the other arguments raised by Best, would be rendered moot by a ruling that Mrs. Astaire presented sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that Best used the film clips and photographs for the purpose of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, the Video Cassettes. Accordingly, there is no reason to address Best's argument now, because it may ultimately be unnecessary to address it at all.

fundamental canons of statutory construction, forbid such a result. *See* 3/8/94 Order at 2 – 7.

In support of its countertextual reading of Section 990(a), Best cites numerous California cases construing California Civil Code Section 3344(a), the statute governing right-of-publicity claims by living celebrities. What Best understandably fails to point out to this court in its Petition, however, is that Section 3344(a) did not include a cause of action for the use of celebrity likenesses "on or in products" until 1984, when it was amended to bring its language into conformity with Section 990(a). See 1984 Cal. Stat., ch. 1704, § 2. Prior to that date, Section 3344(a) authorized suit only where a celebrity's name or likeness was used for the purpose of advertising or soliciting purchases. Thus, the pre-1984 authorities on which Best relies — *Eastwood v. Superior Court,* 149 Cal.App.3d 409, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342 (1983); *Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc.,* 43 Cal.App.3d 880, 118 Cal.Rptr. 370 (1974), and their progeny — are wholly inapposite.[14] In the absence

[14]None of the post-1984 California cases cited by Best involves the question at issue here. *Maheu v. CBS, Inc.,* 201 Cal.App.3d 662, 676 – 77, 247 Cal.Rptr. 304 (1988), for example, involved the meaning of the statutory exemption for news accounts (California Civil Code Section 3344(d)), and provided no opportunity for the court to address the scope of liability under the "uses . . . on or in products" prong of Section 3344(a). Similarly, in *Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc.,* 15 Cal.App.4th 536, 544 – 46, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790 (1993), the court held that a documentary about surfing qualified as a "public affairs . . . account" within the meaning of the Section 3344(d) exemption, but did not purport to address the question whether the use of a celebrity's likeness "on or in products" is actionable in the absence of a use for the purpose of advertising, selling, or solicitation. Finally, in *Leidholdt v. L.F.P. Inc.,* 860 F.2d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 1988), *cert. denied,* 489 U.S. 1080 (1989), this court held that a magazine's use of the plaintiff's likeness to accompany an article expressing the magazine's "opinions in the pornography debate" fell within the Section 3344(d) exemption for uses in " 'any news [or] public affairs . . . account.' " The court did not

of contrary California authority, the district court did not err in construing the statute in accordance with its language, legislative history, and governing canons of construction.

4. There Is No Substantial Group For Difference Of Opinion With Respect To The District Court's Rejection Of Best's First Amendment Defense

Finally, Best contends that the First Amendment shields Best from any liability for its use of the film clips and photographs because the Video Cassettes constitute "an educational medium" of expression and the use of the clips and photographs was "reasonably related to the content of th[at] expression." Petition at 24, 31. As the district court held, however, Best previously conceded that " '[t]he introductory use of brief ornamental dance sequences involving Fred Astaire and other dancers *did not add to the teaching content of these videotapes.*" 3/8/94 order at 11 (emphasis added). Thus, Best is estopped from making a contrary argument here.

In any event, even if Best had not already conceded away this purported First Amendment defense, that defense would have no merit in the circumstances of this case. While courts have consistently held that the First Amendment protects the use of a celebrity's name or likeness in connection with the dissemination of legitimate news, biographical information, or fiction about the celebrity,[15] those cases provide no defense for Best's conduct here. The Video

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discuss the elements of a cause of action for unauthorized uses "on or in products," and thus *Leidholdt* is inapposite.

[15] *See, e.g., Leidholdt v. L.F.P., Inc.*, 860 F.2d. 890 (9th Cir. 1988), *cert. denied*, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989); *Cher v. Forum Int'l, Ltd.*, 692 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1982), *cert. denied*, 462 U.S. 1120 (1983); *Joplin Enterprises v. Allen*, 795 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Wash. 1992); *Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions*, 25 Cal.3d 860, 862, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352 (1979) (Bird, C.J., concurring); *Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc.*, 15 Cal.App.4th 536, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790 (1993).

Cassettes do not convey news or biographical information about Fred Astaire, nor do they offer a fictional account of his life. Instead, they merely exploit his likeness and reputation in the context of a "How To" recreational videotape series. Best can point to no authority for the proposition that the First Amendment precludes imposition of liability in those circumstances.

C. Even If Best Has Satisfied The Statutory Prerequisites To Certification Of An Interlocutory Appeal Under Section 1292(B), This Court Should Deny Certification In The Exercise Of Its Discretion

Even if a party seeking permission to bring an interlocutory appeal satisfies its burden of demonstrating the statutory prerequisites set forth in Section 1292(b), the court of appeals retains discretion to deny permission to appeal "for any reason." *Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,* 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978); *see In re Cement Antitrust Litigation,* 673 F.2d at 1026; *Shurance,* 839 F.2d at 1348 – 49. For all of the reasons set forth above, this court should refuse to permit an interlocutory appeal under the circumstances of this case.

Indeed, this case provides a textbook example of the wisdom of the general rule against piecemeal adjudication of appeals. As noted above, Best is asking this court to decide what may well turn out to be an entirely hypothetical question, namely, whether a claim for infringement of the right of publicity is viable "where there is no use for advertising and selling." Petition at 10. In similar circumstances, other courts of appeals have properly declined to accept interlocutory appeals seeking what amount to advisory opinions on questions that may never need to be decided. *See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,* 622 F.2d 624, 628,(2d Cir. 1980) ("Because the premise of the certified question may be destroyed [on a future appeal], it is not yet ripe for review"); *Paschall v.*

Kansas City Star Co., 605 F.2d 403, 406 (8th Cir. 1979) ("[t]he purpose of section 1292(b) is not to offer advisory opinions"). Particularly in view of this court's general policy against unnecessarily addressing constitutional questions (*see, e.g., Portman v. County of Santa Clara*, 995 F.2d 898, 906 – 07 (9th Cir. 1993); *United States v. Feeney*, 984 F.2d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 1993)), interlocutory review should be denied.

IV.
CONCLUSION

Best cannot meet its burden of satisfying the prerequisites to interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The present status of this litigation, the limited issue remaining to be tried, and the congested nature of this court's docket demonstrate that an immediate appeal would delay, not "materially advance," the ultimate termination of this lawsuit. Moreover, the Orders were well-grounded in law and are not subject to "substantial" grounds for difference of opinion. Mrs. Astaire therefore asks that this court deny Best's Petition so that this litigation can proceed to a speedy resolution on the district court. Once there is a final judgment in that court, the parties will be in a position either to

settle this litigation or exercise their statutory right of appeal to this court.

Dated: April 14, 1994

Respectfully submitted,

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Attorneys for Respondent
Robyn Astaire

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
B-33
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Date 11/26/90
CV-90-0261-IH
Robyn Astaire vs. Ronby Corporation, et al

HON. IRVING HILL
Judge

R. H. MAZZARELLA
Deputy Clerk

CANDEE MARSH
Count Reporter

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PLAINTIFFS:
Joseph F. Hart

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR DEFENDANTS:
Bruce Cohen
Carl I. Kaminsky
for Best Film & Video

Carl Hoffman
for Ronby Corp.

PROCEEDINGS:

HEARING: Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Defendants, Motions for Summary Judgment

Court hears oral argument and denies each defendants', motion for summary judgment having found bona fide disputes of material fact and that each defendant has not shown entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

As to plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, the Court denies said motion on the same grounds and alterna-

tively, the Court exercises its discretionary authority to decline.

All rulings are without prejudice to similar motions being made in limine prior to trial.

With consent of the parties, the Court orders the protective order lifted except as to the will and trust agreement.

Court re-sets the Pretrial Conference on 1/28/91 at 10:00 A.M. and the __ day Jury Trial on 2/19/91 at 9:30 A.M.

Initials of Deputy Clerk

/s/ RHM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 13th day of April 1994, I caused a copy of the foregoing Answer in Opposition to Petition for Permission to Appeal Under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) to be mailed, postage prepaid, to:

GEORGE HEDGES, ESQ.
NANCY C. KRAYBILL, ESQ.
BERNARD JOHN BARRETT
606 South Olive Street
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Los Angeles, CA 90014-1507

/s/ THOMAS G. HUNGAR
Thomas G. Hungar

94-80135
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBYN ASTAIRE, AN INDIVIDUAL,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

BEST FILM & VIDEO CORP.,
Defendant-Petitioner.

DC# CV-90-00261-KN
Central California
(Los Angeles)

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
May 31, 1994
Cathy A. Catterson, Clerk

Before: HUG and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges

ORDER

The petition for permission to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is denied.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
No. 95-56632
No. 95-56633
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBYN ASTAIRE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BEST FILM & VIDEO CORP.
Defendant-Appellant.

D.C. No. CV-90-00261-KN-A

ROBYN ASTAIRE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BEST FILM & VIDEO CORP.
Defendant-Appellant.

D.C. No. CV-90-00261-KN-A

U.S. Court of Appeals
Filed February 25, 1998
Cathy A. Catterson, Clerk

Before: SCHROEDER, WIGGINS, LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Judges Wiggins and Leavy vote to deny the petition for rehearing and recommend rejection of the suggestion for rehearing *en banc*. Judge Schroeder votes to grant the petition for rehearing and accept the suggestion for rehearing *en banc*.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing *en banc,* and no judge has requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing *en banc.* Fed. R. App. P. 35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for rehearing *en banc* is rejected.